Campaign Series (Osprey Publishing):
Battle Orders / Order of Battle Series (Osprey Publishing):
BTO 18: British Commandos 1940-46 |
|
BTO 20: Rommel’s Africa Korps |
|
BTO 32: Panzer Divisions, 1939-40 |
|
Essential Histories Series (Osprey Publishing)
Fortress Series, Osprey Publishing
Fort. 1: Japanese Pacific Island Defenses |
Fort. 29: US World War II Field Fortifications |
Fort. 30: Fort Eben Emael |
|
Fort. 8: Defenses of Pearl Harbor and Oahu |
Fort. 37: D-Day Fortifications in Normandy |
Fort. 10: Maginot Line |
Fort. 41: The Channel Islands |
Fort. 15: Germany’s West Wall - The Siegfried Line |
Fort. 45: German Defences in Italy |
Fort. 16: Fortifications of Malta |
Fort. 62: Soviet Field Fortifications |
Fort. 20: British Home Defences |
Fort. 63: The Atlantic Wall (1) - France |
Fort. 23: German Field Fortifications |
Elite Series, Osprey Publishing
Elite 1: The Paras - British Airborne Forces |
Elite 127: Japanese Paratroop Forces of World War II |
Elite 75: The Indian Army, 1914-1947 |
Elite 136: World War II Airborne Warfare Tactics |
Elite 104: Britain’s Air Defences, 1939-45 |
Elite 141: Finland at War 1939-45 |
Elite 109: The British Home Front, 1939-45 |
Elite 144: US Amphibious Tactics in the EMTO |
Elite 117: US Amphibious Tactics in the PTO |
Elite 151: World War II Jungle Warfare Tactics |
Warrior Series, Osprey Publishing
War. 45: US Infantryman (1) - PTO 1941-45 |
War. 73: Tito’s Partisans, 1941-45 |
War. 53: US Infantryman (2) - MTO 1942-45 |
|
War. 56: US Infantryman (3) - ETO 1944-45 |
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War. 59: German Infantryman (1), 1933-40 |
|
___________________________________________________________
Militarymaps is a noncommercial project, all materials are presented for educational purposes only.
___________________________________________________________
Maps are presented in the DjVu format. File size 30 Kb - 1 Mb.
___________________________________________________________
(Stephen Badsey. Osprey Publishing, 1990)
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Map 1. Operation "Overlord", D-Day, 6 June 1944 (p.34-35)
Map 2. D-Day. The landing of British 8 Brigade Group at "Sword" Beach, 0730 hours, 6 June 1944 (p.38-39)
Map 3. Operation "Overlord". Situation 1 July 1944 (D+24) (p.50-51)
Map 4. Operation "Goodwood". Tactical situation, 1000 hours 18 July 1944 (p.62-63)
Map 5. Operation "Goodwood", 18-20 July 1944 (p.66)
Map 6. "Goodwood" result, 20 July 1944 (p.67)
Map 7. Operation "Cobra", 25 July 1944 (p.70-71)
Map 8. Mortain counter-attack. Dawn, 0500 hours 7 August 1944 (p.74-75)
Map 9. The Breakout, 16 August 1944 (p.78-79)
Map 10. The Falaise Pocket, 16 August 1944 (p.82-83)
___________________________________________________________
(Alan Shepperd. Osprey Publishing, 1990)
___________________________________________________________
Map 1. The Opening Moves (p.34)
Map 2. Area round Dinant (p.42)
Map 3. Rommel at the Meuse. Night of 12/13 May 1940 (p.46-47)
Map 4. Guderian at the Meuse. 1500 hours 13 May 1940 (p.50-51)
Map 5. Area round Sedan (p.66)
Map 6. The Panzer Breakthrough (p.74)
Map 7. The Fall of Cambrai. 18 May 1940 (p.78-79)
Map 8. The Race to the Sea (p.83)
Map 9. Last Days in the North (p.87)___________________________________________________________
(James R. Arnold. Osprey Publishing, 1990)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.90-91)
Map 1. Planned Routes of Advance: 1 SS Panzer Corps (p.26)
Map 2. “Wacht am Rhein” - The German Plan (p.27)
Map 3. The German Assault, to 20 December (p.35)
Map 4. US 110/28th Division’s Delaying Action. 16 to 18 December 1944 (p.38-39)
Map 5. The German Assault, from 20 to 24 December (p.63)
Map 6. The Defence of Bastogne (p.70-71)
Map 7. The Battle for Champs. 25 December 1944 (p.74-75)
Map 8. Combat at Baraque de Fraiture. 20 to 23 December 1944 (p.82-83)
___________________________________________________________
(Mark Healy. Osprey Publishing, 1992)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.91-92)
Map 1. The Kursk Salient: German Offensive Intentions and Soviet Dispositions (p.6)
Map 2. The Offensive of Model’s Ninth Army, 5-11 July 1943 (p.34)
Map 3. The Assault on Cherkasskoye by XLVIII Panzer Corps on 5 July 1943 (p.38-39)
Map 4. Von Manstein’s Assault on the Voronezh Front, 5-14 July 1943 (p.42)
Map 5. The Battle for Ponyri. 5-12 July 1943 (p.50-51)
Map 6. The Tank Battle for Prokhorovka. 12 July 1943 (p.78-79)
Map 7. The Soviet Offensive Against the Orel Bulge, 12 July to 18 August 1943 (p.82)
Map 8. Operation “Rumantsyev”: The Soviet Counter-Offensive Against Belgorod and Kharkov (p.87)
___________________________________________________________
(Joseph N. Mueller. Osprey Publishing, 1992)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.91-92)
Map 1. The Strategic Situation, July-August 1942 (p.6)
Map 2. American Landing on Guadalcanal (p.26-27)
Map 3. American Landings on Florida, Tulagi, Tanambogo and Gavutu Islands (p.27)
Map 4. August-September 1942 Operations on Guadalcanal (p.42-43)
Map 5. Battle of the Tenaru. 20-21 August 1942 (p.46-47)
Map 6. Battle of “Bloody Ridge”. 12-14 September 1942 (p.54-55)
Map 7. The Matanikau Offensive of 7-9 October 1942 (p.66)
Map 8. The Battle for Henderson Field, 23-5 October 1942 (p.66-67)
Map 9. The November 1942 Battles on Guadalcanal. Victory at Koli Point (p.74-75)
Map 10. The January Offensive. Clearing the slopes of Mount Austen and the Matanikau sector (p.82-83)
Map 11. Victory an Guadalcanal, January to February 1943 (p.87)
___________________________________________________________
(Stephen Badsey. Osprey Publishing, 1993)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.91)
Map 1. The Allied Pursuit, 26 August to 10 September 1944 (p.6-7)
Map 2. Market-Garden, The Plan 17 September 1944 (p.26-27)
Map 3. Operation Market: The Allied Fly-in, 17 September 1944 (p.34-35)
Map 4. Market-Garden: Area of Operations, 16-26 September 1944 (p.42)
Map 5. Arnhem: British Airborne Division Operations, 17-21 September 1944 (p.46-47)
Map 6. Arnhem Bridge, 17-23 September 1944 (p.50-51)
Map 7. The River Crossing at Nijmegen. 1500-2000 20 September 1944 (p.62-63)
Map 8. 1st Airborne Division Perimeter, Oosterbeek. 20-26 September 1944 (p.66-67)
___________________________________________________________
(Mark Healy. Osprey Publishing, 1993)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.91-93)
Map 1. Operations AL and MI (p.10)
Map 2. The Fleets Converge (p.43)
Map 3. Air Search Patterns of First Carrier Air Fleet, 0430 onwards, 4 June (p.51)
Map 4. The Japanese air strikes on the island of Midway, 0400 to 0643 hours, 4 June 1942 (p.58-59)
Map 5. Operations on 4 June 1942 (p.66-67)
Map 6. The Carrier Air Strikes on Nagumo’s Carriers, 0920-1200 (p.70-71)
Map 7. The destruction of the Japanese flagship Akagi, 1026 hours to 0500 hours, 4 June 1942 (p.78-79)
Map 8. The Loss of Yorktown, 1050 hours on 4 June to 0500 hours on 7 June 1942 (p.82-83)
___________________________________________________________
(Steven Zaloga. Osprey Publishing, 1996)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.86-88)
Map 1. Strategic Situation on the Eastern Front, 23 June 1944 (p.6)
Map 2. Opposing Forces, 23 June 1944 (p.23)
Map 3. Operation Bagration: Red Army Operations, 23 June - 10 July 1944 (p.46-47)
Map 4. Breakthrough at Orsha, 23-26 June 1944 (p.54-55)
Map 5. The Liberation of Minsk, 29 June - 3 July 1944 (p.66-67)
Map 6. The Lvov-Sandomierz Offensive, July-August 1944 (p.74-75)
Map 7. The German Counter-Attack on the Magnuszew Bridgehead, 8 August 1944 (p.78-79)
Map 8. Strategic Situation on the Eastern Front, 23 August 1944 (p.83)
___________________________________________________________
(Chris Henry. Osprey Publishing, 1999)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.88)
Map 1. The strategic situation in Spain prior to the Ebro offensive, July 1938 (p.7)
Map 2. The Campaign: the crossing of the Ebro, 24-25 July 1938 (p.30-31)
Map 3. The first day of the crossing, Ribaroja - Flix Sector (p.38-39)
Map 4. The assault on Villalba de Los Arcos and Cuatro Caminos, 26 July - 2 August (p.46-47)
Map 5. The assault on Gandesa, 26-31 July 1938 (p.50)
Map 6. The attack on the Sierra Pandols, 9-15 August (p.58-59)
Map 7. The destruction of the Fayon - Mequinenza Pocket, 6-7 August 1938 (p.63)
Map 8. The final nationalist counter-offensive, 30 October - 16 November 1938 (p.70)
___________________________________________________________
(Carl Smith. Osprey Publishing, 2001)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.19-23)
Map 1. The Japanese Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (p.8)
Map 2. Pearl Harbor 0730 hrs December 7, 1941 (p.28-29)
Map 3. The First and Second Attack Wave Paths (p.40)
Map 4. The First Attack Wave, Pearl Harbor, 0750-0810 hrs (p.44-45)
Map 5. The Attacks on Hickam Field Army Air Base, 0755-0920 hrs (p.52-53)
Map 6. The Attacks on Ewa, Wheeler Field and Bellows Field (p.60)
Map 7. The Attacks on Kaneohe Naval Air Station (p.61)
Map 8. The Second Attack Wave, Pearl Harbor, 0905-0945 hrs (p.72-73)
Map 9. The path through the harbor of the USS Nevada’s attempted escape (p.76-77)
Map 10. The Japanese Tidal Wave, December 1941 - January 1942 (p.84)
___________________________________________________________
(Jon Latimer. Osprey Publishing, 2000)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.89)
Map 1. The Mediterranean Theatre (p.6)
Map 2. The Italian Invasion of Egypt (p.10)
Map 3. Operation Compass, 9-11 December 1940 (p.30-31)
Map 4. Assault on Bardia, 3-5 January 1941 (p.50-51)
Map 5. Tobruk (p.55)
Map 6. The Advance to Derna and Mechili (p.66)
Map 7. The Road to Beda Fomm (p.79)
Map 8. The Battle of Beda Fomm, 5-7 February 1941 (p.82-83)
___________________________________________________________
(Ken Ford. Osprey Publishing, 2000)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.85)
Map 1. The Rhineland: German and Allied Positions at Start of Offensive (p.6)
Map 2. Operation Veritable, 8 February 1945 (p.26)
Map 3. The Capture of the Reichswald Forest and Cleve, February 1945 (p.27)
Map 4. The Capture of the Schwammenauel Dam, 5-9 February 1945 (p.38-39)
Map 5. British 43rd (Wessex) Division Advance to the Goch Escarpment, 13-17 February 1945 (p.46-47)
Map 6. Operation Grenade, February 1945 (p.54)
Map 7. US 84 Division Cross the River Roer at Linnich, 24 February 1945 (p.58-59)
Map 8. Operation Blockbuster, February 1945 (p.70)
Map 9. Clearing the Southern Rhineland, March 1945 (p.78)
___________________________________________________________
(Steven J. Zaloga. Osprey Publishing, 2000)
___________________________________________________________
Map 1. The Strategic Situation, 1 September 1944 (p.7)
Map 2. Hitler’s Planned Panzer Offensive, 10 September 1944 (p.10)
Map 3. Patton’s Third Army Crosses the Moselle River, 5-11 September 1944 (p.34)
Map 4. The Destruction of Panzer Brigade 106, 8 September 1944 (p.38-39)
Map 5. 4th Armored Division Encircles Nancy, 11-14 September 1944 (p.46)
Map 6. The Destruction of Panzer Brigade 112 at Dompaire, 13 September 1944 (p.58-59)
Map 7. Tank Battle at Arracourt, 19 September 1944 (p.70-71)
Map 8. Arracourt: 25-29 September 1944 (p.82)
___________________________________________________________
(Derrick Wright. Osprey Publishing, 2000)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.12)
Map 1. Japanese Possessions, November 1943 (p.11)
Map 2. Tarawa Atoll (p.23)
Map 3. The Landing Beaches, November 20, 1943 (p.30)
Map 4. The Marines Attack, November 20, 1943 (p.46)
Map 5. USMC Gains by 1800 hrs, November 20, 1943 (p.47)
Map 6. Betio Island, Tarawa Atoll. D-Day, November 20, 1943 (p.50-51)
Map 7. Betio Island, Tarawa Atoll. D-Day+1, November 21, 1943 (p.62-63)
Map 8. USMC Gains by 1800 hrs, November 21, 1943 (p.74)
Map 9. USMC Gains, November 22-23, 1943 (p.75)
Map 10. Betio Island, Tarawa Atoll. D-Day+3, November 23, 1943 (p.78-79)
___________________________________________________________
(Jon Latimer. Osprey Publishing, 2001)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.10)
Map 1. The British Position in the Mediterranean, March 1941 (p.6)
Map 2. Rommel’s Dash Across Cyrenaica, 31 March - 11 April 1941 (p.30)
Map 3. The German Attack of 13-14 April (p.47)
Map 4. Rommel’s Attack on Ras el Madauur, 30 April - 2 May 1941 (p.54-55)
Map 5. Perimeter Dispositions on the Morning of 5 May 1941 (p.59)
Map 6. Operation “Brevity”, 15-16 May 1941 (p.66-67)
Map 7. Tobruk - Main Defences and Principal Bombing Targets (p.71)
Map 8. Operation “Battleaxe”, 15-17 June 1941 (p.78-79)
Map 9. A German map showing the Tobruk defences (p.80)
___________________________________________________________
(Derrick Wright. Osprey Publishing, 2001)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.78)
Map 1. Area under Japanese Control, end of September 1944 (approx) (p.8)
Map 2. Japanese Defense Sectors and US Landing Beaches (p.20)
Map 3. Assault on Mount Suribachi, D-Day - D+4 (p.44-45)
Map 4. Assault on the Meatgrinder, D+6 - D+19 (p.52-53)
Map 5. The Attack North, D+5 - D+16 (p.60-61)
Map 6. US Gains by end of D+19 (p.68)
___________________________________________________________
(Steven J. Zaloga. Osprey Publishing, 2001)
___________________________________________________________
Map 1. Strategic Situation in Normandy, 2-24 July 1944 (p.6)
Map 2. Operation Cobra - The Plan (p.34)
Map 3. Carpet Bombing of Panzer Lehr Division, 25-26 July 1944 (p.38-39)
Map 4. Operation Cobra - The Breakthrough 25-30 July 1944 (p.54)
Map 5. The Race for the Breton Ports (p.58)
Map 6. Counterattack at Mortain, 7 August 1944 (p.70-71)
Map 7. Normandy to the Seine - 6-25 August 1944 (p.82-83)
___________________________________________________________
(Ken Ford. Osprey Publishing, 2001)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.11)
Map 1. St. Nazaire, March 1942 (p.9)
Map 2. From Falmouth to St. Nazaire (p.37)
Map 3. The Run in to the Docks (p.40)
Map 4. The Flotilla (p.48)
Map 5. St. Nazaire ten minutes after HMS “Campbeltown” rams the Dock Gates, 28 March 1942, 01.45 hrs (p.52-53)
Map 6. The Commandos Attack Targets around the Normandie Dock, 28 March 1942 (p.56-57)
Map 7. The Dockyard Targets (p.60)
Map 8. Attacks on the Southern Targets and the Breakout, 28 March 1942 (p.72-73)
___________________________________________________________
(Gordon L. Rottman. Osprey Publishing, 2002)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.17)
Map 1. Strategic Situation, March 1945 (p.6)
Map 2. Okinawa Gunto (p.19)
Map 3. The Landing Beaches, 1 April 1945 (p.55)
Map 4. Ie Shima Assault, 16-21 April 1945 (p.67)
Map 5. The Japanese Counteroffensive, 4-6 May 1945 (p.74-75)
Map 6. Battle for Sugar Loaf Hill, 13-19 May 1945 (p.78-79)
Map 7. Withdrawal of 32nd Army, 25 May to 4 June 1945 (p.82)
Map 8. Final Stand in the South, 11-21 June 1945 (p.86-87)
___________________________________________________________
(Steven J. Zaloga. Osprey Publishing, 2003)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.12)
Map 1. German Forces in the Grandcamps Sector, 6 June 1944 (p.8)
Map 2. Omaha Beach - Cross-Sectional View (p.21)
Map 3. Assault Landing Plan, 116th RCT, Omaha Beach (West) (p.24)
Map 4. V Corps D-Day Objectives (p.28)
Map 5. Omaha Beach 16th Regimental Combat Team Sector, 6 June 1944, 0630 hrs (p.44-45)
Map 6. Omaha Beach 116th Regimental Combat Team Sector, 6 June 1944, 0629 hrs (p.48-49)
Map 7. 2nd Rangers at Pointe-Du-Hoc, 0710 hrs 6 June - 0300 hrs 7 June 1944 (p.76-77)
Map 8. V Corps D-Day Operations, 6 June 1944 (p.88)
___________________________________________________________
(Steven J. Zaloga. Osprey Publishing, 2004)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.9)
Map 1. German Defenses on the Cotentin Peninsula, 6 June 1944 (p.15)
Map 2. US Airborne Landings, 6 June 1944 (p.31)
Map 3. Battle for the la Fiere Bridge, Merderet River, 6-9 June 1944 (p.42-43)
Map 4. Assault Waves, Combat Team 8, Utah Beach, 06.30-09.00 hrs, 6 June 1944 (p.54-55)
Map 5. Securing Utah Beach, 7 June 1944 (p.66)
Map 6. Battle for Carentan, 10-13 June 1944 (p.70)
Map 7. Cutting off the Cotentin, 10-18 June 1944 (p.79)
Map 8. The Capture of Cherbourg, 22-30 June 1944 (p.86-87)
___________________________________________________________
(Ken Ford. Osprey Publishing, 2002)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.10-13)
Map 1. British 6th Airborne Division - D-Day, 6 June 1944 (p.26)
Map 2. German Defences of Sword Beach Area (p.27)
Map 3. British 6th Airborne Division - The Eastern Flank, 6 June 1944, 0020 hrs - 2100 hrs (p.38-39)
Map 4. The Landings on Sword Beach (p.51)
Map 5. 3rd Division on Queen Red and Queen White Beaches, 6 June 1944, 0725 hrs - 1500 hrs (p.54-55)
Map 6. 21st Panzer Division’s Counterattack, 6 June 1944, approx 1600 hrs - 2100 hrs (p.70-71)
Map 7. Night of 6 June - The Allied Lodgement (p.75)
Map 8. Expanding the Beachhead and the Battle for Caen (p.86)
___________________________________________________________
(Steven J. Zaloga. Osprey Publishing, 2002)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.11-12)
Map 1. The German Attack, 1 September 1939 (p.37)
Map 2. Defense of Westerplatte, 1-7 September 1939 (p.40-41)
Map 3. Cavalry vs. Armour at Mokra, 1 September 1939 (p.48-49)
Map 4. The Race for Warsaw, 7 September 1939 (p.61)
Map 5. Bzura Counter-Offensive, 9-12 September 1939 (p.68)
Map 6. Bzura Counter-Offensive, 13-14 September 1939 (p.69)
Map 7. The Battle for Warsaw, 8-26 September 1939 (p.76-77)
Map 8. Eve of the Soviet Attack, 17 September 1939 (p.81)
___________________________________________________________
(J. Morgan & G. Rottman. Osprey Publishing, 2002)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.14-15)
Map 1. Strategic situation, late 1944 (p.6)
Map 2. The Palau Islands, 1944 (p.11)
Map 3. Peleliu Island (p.19)
Map 4. Peleliu - D-Day, 15 September 1944 (p.42-43)
Map 5. The Battle for Peleliu, 15-23 September (D-Day to D+8) (p.59)
Map 6. Capture of Angaur Island, 17-20 September (p.67)
Map 7. Securing the North, 24-29 September (D+9 to D+14) (p.74-75)
Map 8. The Umurbrogol Mountains (p.83)
Map 9. Reduction of the Umurbrogol Pocket, 27 September - 27 November (p.86-87)
___________________________________________________________
(Ken Ford. Osprey Publishing, 2002)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.9-11)
Map 1. German Defences - Gold Beach (p.34)
Map 2. 69th Brigade, 50th Division, King Sector, Gold Beach. 6 June 1944, 0730 hrs - 1500 hrs (p.42-43)
Map 3. British Assault on Gold Beach (p.54)
Map 4. German Defences - Juno Beach (p.59)
Map 5. Canadian 3rd Brigade on Nan White and Red Beaches. 6 June 1944, 0755 hrs to mid-afternoon (p.66-67)
Map 6. Canadian 3rd Division Landings on Juno Beach (p.71)
Map 7. Situation at Midnight, 6 June (p.79)
Map 8. Villers-Bocage, 12 June 1944, 0855 hrs - 0910 hrs (p.86-87)
___________________________________________________________
(Steven J. Zaloga. Osprey Publishing, 2002)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.9)
Map 1. Strategic Situation, 16 December 1944 (p.6)
Map 2. Planned Routes of Advance of 6th Panzer Army (p.11)
Map 3. Battle for the Twin Villages, 17-18 December 1944 (p.34-35)
Map 4. Initial Attacks of 6th Panzer Army (p.43)
Map 5. Destruction of 106th Infantry Division, 16-19 December 1944 (p.58)
Map 6. Kampfgruppe Peiper, 18-23 December 1944 (p.74-75)
Map 7. Hitlerjugend Halted at Dom Butgenbach, 18-21 December (p.78-79)
Map 8. Defense of St. Vith, 17-23 December (p.83)
___________________________________________________________
(Ken Ford. Osprey Publishing. 2003)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.12-15)
Map 1. Sea Routes to Dieppe (p.30)
Map 2. Operation Jubilee (p.31)
Map 3. German Defences of Dieppe (p.35)
Map 4. Yellow Beach (p.42)
Map 5. 4 Commando's Destruction of Hess Battery, 19 August 1942, 0450-0900 hrs (p.46-47)
Map 6. Green Beach, 19 August 1942, 0455-0845 hrs (p.58-59)
Map 7. Assault on Dieppe, 19 August 1942, 0507-0830 hrs (p.62-63)
Map 8. Dieppe - The Air Battle (p.78)
___________________________________________________________
(Robert Kirchubel. Osprey Publishing, 2003)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.12-13)
Map 1. The eve of Barbarossa - Army Group South (p.6)
Map 2. Frontier Battles (p.34-35)
Map 3. The Uman Kessel, 16 July - 3 August 1941 (p.46-47)
Map 4. The Kiev Pocket (p.59)
Map 5. The Capture of the Crimea (p.67)
Map 6. Battle of the Sea of Azov, 26 September - 7 October 1941 (p.70-71)
Map 7. The Donbas and Rostov (p.75)
Map 8. The Battle for Rostov, 17 November - 3 December 1941 (p.78-79)
Map 9. Strategic Overview (p.91)
___________________________________________________________
(Ken Ford. Osprey Publishing, 2004)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.12-14)
Map 1. Advance to the Gustav Line (p.6)
Map 2. US Fifth Army’s Attack on the Gustav Line (p.34)
Map 3. US VI Corps’ Landings at Anzio, 22 January 1944 (p.39)
Map 4. US II Corps’ Attack North of Cassino, 24 January - 12 February 1944 (p.50-51)
Map 5. New Zealand II Corps’ Attack (p.58)
Map 6. The Third Battle of Cassino, 12-19 March 1944 (p.62-63)
Map 7. Operation Diadem - The Allies Break Through the Gustav Line (p.74)
Map 8. Polish II Corps Captures the Monastery, 11-18 May 1944 (p.78-79)
___________________________________________________________
(Edward M. Young. Osprey Publishing, 2004)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.14-15)
Map 1. The Burma Front, 1 November 1944 (p.6)
Map 2. Operation “Extended Capital” (p.34)
Map 3. IV and XXXIII Corps Crossings of the Irrawaddy River (p.38)
Map 4. 7th Division Cross the Irrawaddy, 14-16 February 1945 (p.42-43)
Map 5. The Armored Thrust to Meiktila, 21-28 February 1945 (p.54)
Map 6. The Battle for Meiktila, 1 March 1945 (p.58-59)
Map 7. Defense of Meiktila, 5-14 March 1945 (p.70)
Map 8. The Defence of Meiktila, 15-29 March 1945 (p.78-79)
Map 9. The Advance on Rangoon, April-May 1945 (p.90)
___________________________________________________________
(Gordon L. Rottman. Osprey Publishing, 2004)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.12-13)
Map 1. Japanese Defenses, Saipan (p.21)
Map 2. Japanese Defenses, Tinian (p.25)
Map 3. D-Day - Green Beach, Saipan. 15 June 1944 (p.44-45)
Map 4. Central Saipan, 27 June (p.66)
Map 5. Japanese Banzai Attack, Night of 6/7 July 1944 (p.70-71)
Map 6. J-Day, Tinian. 24 July 1944 (p.78-79)
Map 7. The Capture of Tinian, 25 July - 1 August (p.86)
___________________________________________________________
(Gordon L. Rottman. Osprey Publishing, 2004)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.16-17)
Map 1. Strategic Situation Pacific Theater, December 1943 (p.6)
Map 2. Mariana Islands, summer 1944 (p.10)
Map 3. Japanese Defenses, Guam (p.26)
Map 4. Beach Sketch, Northern Sector (p.36)
Map 5. Beach Sketch, Southern Sector (p.40)
Map 6. Securing the Beachhead, 21st and 9th Marines, 21 July 1944 (p.46-47)
Map 7. The Fight for the Beachheads (p.50)
Map 8. The Capture of Orote Peninsula, 24-30 July (p.54-55)
Map 9. The Japanese Counterattack, Night of 25/26 July (p.62-63)
Map 10. Daily Progress, 21 July - 10 August 1944 (p.74)
___________________________________________________________
(Ken Ford. Osprey Publishing, 2004)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.10)
Map 1. First Allied Moves on Caen (p.6)
Map 2. Counterattack by 12th SS-Panzer Division "Hitlerjugend", 7 June 1944 (p.30-31)
Map 3. Operation "Epsom", 24-30 June (p.38)
Map 4. Operation "Charnwood" and the Capture of Caen (p.51)
Map 5. Operation "Jupiter" - The Attack on Hill 112, 10-11 July 1944 (p.58-59)
Map 6. Operation "Goodwood" - Plan of Attack (p.67)
Map 7. Operation "Goodwood", 18-21 July 1944 (p.74-75)
___________________________________________________________
(Steven J. Zaloga. Osprey Publishing, 2004)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.9)
Map 1. German Objectives Southern Sector (p.11)
Map 2. 5th Panzer Army vs. 28th Division (p.30)
Map 3. 7th Army vs. XII Corps (p.35)
Map 4. Bastogne Encircled, 19-23 December 1944 (p.42-43)
Map 5. Patton’s Relief of Bastogne (p.67)
Map 6. Battle for the Road Junctions, 23-27 December 1944 (p.70-71)
Map 7. Blunting the Spearhead, 24-27 December 1944 (p.82-83)
Map 8. Eliminating the Bulge, 3-28 January 1945 (p.90)
___________________________________________________________
(Gordon L. Rottman. Osprey Publishing, 2004)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.17)
Map 1. Strategic Situation in the Pacific, January 1944 (p.6)
Map 2. Marshal and Gilbert Islands, January 1944 (p.10)
Map 3. Kwajalein Atoll (p.11)
Map 4. Majuro Atoll (p.37)
Map 5. D-Day Roi-Namur, 31 January 1944 (p.39)
Map 6. Roi-Namur Islands, D+1 - D+2. 06.50 hrs, 1 February - 14.18 hrs, 2 February 1944 (p.42-43)
Map 7. Southern Kwajalein (p.55)
Map 8. Kwajalein Island, D+1. 09.30 hrs, 1 February - 19.20 hrs, 4 February (p.58-59)
Map 9. Capture of Burton, 3-4 February 1944 (p.68)
Map 10. Engebi Island, 08.43 - 18.30 hrs, 18 February 1944 (p.70-71)
Map 11. Capture of Eniwetok Island, 19-21 February 1944 (p.78)
Map 12. Capture of Eniwetok Island, 19-21 February 1944 (p.79)
Map 13. Capture of Parry Island, 22 February 1944 (p.81)
___________________________________________________________
(Peter D. Antill. Osprey Publishing, 2005)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.14-16)
Map 1. Balkans Campaign, 6-30 April 1941 (p.11)
Map 2. Crete (p.32)
Map 3. Maleme, 20-22 May 1941 (p.38-39)
Map 4. Souda Bay / Prison Valley, 20-22 May (p.46)
Map 5. Rethymnon, 20-21 May (p.47)
Map 6. Heraklion, 20-26 May (p.50)
Map 7. German Advance on Platanias, 23 May 1941 (p.66-67)
Map 8. German Advance on Galatos, 24-26 May 1941 (p.70-71)
Map 9. The German Advance and Allied Retreat, Hania to Sphakion, 27-31 May (p.74)
___________________________________________________________
(Robert Kirchubel. Osprey Publishing, 2005)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.13)
Map 1. Frontier Battles (p.32)
Map 2. Operation "Platinfuchs" (p.52)
Map 3. Operation "Polarfuchs" (p.53)
Map 4. Karelia (p.57)
Map 5. Soviet Attacks around Staraya Russa, 12-23 August 1941 (p.68-69)
Map 6. German Joint Assaults on Baltic Islands, 13 September - 22 October 1941 (p.72-73)
Map 7. Battle on the Luga River Line and approaches to Leningrad, August-September 1941 (p.76-77)
Map 8. Tikhvin / Volkhov (p.84)
Map 9. Strategic Overview, Finland (p.88)
Map 10. Strategic Overview, Army Group North (p.89)
___________________________________________________________
(Ken Ford. Osprey Publishing, 2005)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.10-12)
Map 1. Allied Frontline before the Breakout Battles (p.6)
Map 2. The Breakout (p.31)
Map 3. Operation "Bluecoat" (p.38)
Map 4. Capture of Mont Pincon (Point 365) (p.42-43)
Map 5. Operations "Totalise" and "Tractable" (p.54-55)
Map 6. Forming the Falaise Pocket (p.62)
Map 7. Sealing the Pocket, 18-21 August 1944 (p.74-75)
Map 8. The German Collapse (p.90)
___________________________________________________________
(Steven J. Zaloga. Osprey Publishing, 2005)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.13)
Map 1. The Strategic Situation, February 10, 1943 (p.9)
Map 2. Preliminary Moves in Central Tunisia, January 30 - February 3, 1943 (p.32)
Map 3. Rival Axis Plans, January 30 - February 20, 1943 (p.36)
Map 4. Sidi Bou Zid, February 14-15, 1943 (p.44-45)
Map 5. Kasserine Pass, February 20-22, 1943 (p.56-57)
Map 6. Operation "Wop", March 16-23, 1943 (p.69)
Map 7. El Guettar, March 23, 1943 (p.72-73)
Map 8. US II Corps in Northern Tunisia, April 23 - May 9, 1943 (p.81)
___________________________________________________________
(Steven J. Zaloga. Osprey Publishing, 2005)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.10)
Map 1. Strategic Situation in Italy, January 1944 (p.6)
Map 2. Anzio Beach Head, 1 February 1944 (p.26)
Map 3. Operation "Shingle", 22 January 1944 (p.30-31)
Map 4. Battle for the Thumb, 3-11 February 1944 (p.46-47)
Map 5. Operation "Fischfang", 16-20 February 1944 (p.54-55)
Map 6. Operation "Seitensprung", 28 February - 3 March 1944 (p.70)
Map 7. Operation "Buffalo", 23-24 May 1944 (p.78)
Map 8. The Race for Rome, 31 May - 1 June 1944 (p.83)
___________________________________________________________
(Clayton Chun. Osprey Publishing, 2006)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.11-12)
Map 1. Japanese Conquest of the Pacific, December 1941 - April 1942 (p.6)
Map 2. Japanese Areas of Defensive Responsibility, April 1942 (p.26)
Map 3. Task Force 16’s Route, April 13-21 (p.38)
Map 4. The Launch of the B-25B Bombers, and the Sinking of The Japanese Picket Ships, April 18 (p.50)
Map 5. The Doolittle Raid over Tokyo Bay (p.54-55)
Map 6. The Attack on Nagoya by 40-2297 (p.74-75)
Map 7. The Attack on Kobe (p.82)
Map 8. The Planned and Actual Landing Sites Following the Doolittle Raid (p.86)
___________________________________________________________
(Ken Ford. Osprey Publishing, 2005)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.12-14)
Map 1. Eight Army Retreat (p.9)
Map 2. First Alamein (p.33)
Map 3. Alam El Halfa: Rommel’s Last Chance, 31 August - 4 September 1942 (p.)
Map 4. Alam Halfa: Rommel’s Final Offensive (p.52)
Map 5. Alamein: Operations "Lightfoot" and "Supercharge" (p.64)
Map 6. The Dog Fight, 26-30 October 1942 (p.76-77)
Map 7. Operation "Supercharge": The Break Out, 2-4 November 1942 (p.80-81)
Map 8. Eight Army Drive (p.88)
___________________________________________________________
(Peter Antill. Osprey Publishing, 2005)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.12-14)
Map 1. From the Vistula to the Oder. Soviet Offensive Operations, January-February 1945 (p.6)
Map 2. The Encirclement of Berlin, 16-28 April 1945 (p.38)
Map 3. Attack on the Seelow Heights. Soviet Operations 14-19 April 1945 (p.46-47)
Map 4. Squeezing the Berlin Pocket, 23-28 April 1945 (p.51)
Map 5. Into the Centre of Berlin. Soviet Operations 28 April - 2 May 1945 (p.62-63)
Map 6. Breakout of the 9th Army, 28 April - 1 May 1945 (p.67)
Map 7. Assault on the Reichstag. Soviet Operations 28 April - 2 May 1945 (p.70-71)
___________________________________________________________
(Bernard Ireland. Osprey Publishing, 2006)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.10-11)
Map 1. The Philippines as an Objective (p.6)
Map 2. Approach of Japanese Attack and Decoy Forces (p.23)
Map 3. Leyte: Assault Organization (p.27)
Map 4. Japanese Plan of Attack (p.30)
Map 5. Northern Landings, Leyte, 20 October 1944 - 1000 (p.34-35)
Map 6. The Battle off Samar - 25 October 1944 (p.59)
Map 7. The Battle off Samar, 25 October 1944, 0820-0850 hrs (p.62-63)
Map 8. The Battle of Surgao Strait, 25 October 1944 (p.82)
___________________________________________________________
(Robert Lyman. Osprey Publishing, 2006)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.16-17)
Map 1. British and German Operations in Iraq, April-June 1941 (p.6)
Map 2. British Movements April-June 1941, With Pre-War Iraqi Army Dispositions (p.14)
Map 3. British Operations in Basra, May 1941 (p.30)
Map 4. Habbaniya and Falluja, 16-22 May 1941 (p.34-35)
Map 5. The Siege of Raf Habbaniya, May 1941 (p.38)
Map 6. Advance to Baghdad, 28-30 May 1941 (p.66-67)
Map 7. The British Advance to Baghdad, May 1941 (p.79)
Map 8. Capture of Ashar, 7 May 1941 (p.82-83)
___________________________________________________________
(Robert Forczyk. Osprey Publishing, 2006)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.10)
Map 1. Strategic Dispositions on the Eastern Front, 30 September 1941 (p.6)
Map 2. Dispositions on the Moscow Axis, 30 September 1941 (p.14)
Map 3. German Attacks and Soviet Reactions, 30 September - 15 October 1941 (p.31)
Map 4. Soviet Delaying Action at Mtensk, 5-10 October 1941 (p.46-47)
Map 5. German Assault at Borodino, 13-18 October 1941 (p.52-53)
Map 6. The Defence of Tula and Guderian’s Final Attacks, 29 October - 5 December 1941 (p.60)
Map 7. The Yakhroma Bridgehead, 27-29 November 1941 (p.68-69)
Map 8. Typhoon’s Last Gasp: 15 November - 5 December 1941 (p.76)
Map 9. Initial Soviet Counterattacks and German Withdrawals, 5-16 December 1941 (p.85)
___________________________________________________________
(Steven J. Zaloga. Osprey Publishing, 2006)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.12)
Map 1. Closing on the Rhine, 8 February - 10 March 1945 (p.6)
Map 2. Operation "Lumberjack", March 1-7, 1945 (p.38-39)
Map 3. Remagen, March 7/8, 1945 (The capture of the Ludendorff Bridge) (p.46-47)
Map 4. Bouncing the Rhine, March 24-28, 1945 (p.66)
Map 5. Breakout from Remagen, March 24-28, 1945 (p.70)
Map 6. Operation "Voyage", March 29 - 1 April, 1945 (p.74-75)
Map 7. Encircling the Ruhr, March 24 - April 4, 1945 (p.82)
Map 8. Aftermath of Remagen, April 4-18, 1945 (p.86)
___________________________________________________________
(Ken Ford. Osprey Publishing, 2006)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.12-14)
Map 1. The Rhine with Allied and German Positions (p.6)
Map 2. 21st Army Group’s Operations (p.34)
Map 3. Operation "Widgeon": 1st Commando Brigade’s Attack on Wesel (p.42-43)
Map 4. Operation "Plunder" (p.46)
Map 5. Operation "Flashpoint" (p.50)
Map 6. Operation "Varsity": US XVIII Airborne Corp’s Assault East of the Rhine (p.58-59)
Map 7. From the Rhine to the Baltic (p.80)
Map 8. Expanding 21st Army Group’s Bridgehead, 24-28 March 1945 (p.88-89)
___________________________________________________________
(Steven J. Zaloga. Osprey Publishing, 2007)
___________________________________________________________
See also Fortress 15: Germany’s West Wall - The Siegfried Line
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.8)
Map 1. The strategic situation August 25 - September 11, 1944 (p.10)
Map 2. The Westwall defenses in the Aachen sector (p.19)
Map 3. This schematic shows a typical stretch of the Westwall near Aachen in the area first penetrated by the 1/26th Infantry. The dragon's teeth (1) were positioned in front, with a string of bunkers behind (2); the bunker's machine guns provided overlapping fields of fire (3) (p.22)
Map 4. The first battle of Aachen: the Stolberg corridor, September 12-29, 1944 (p.34)
Map 5. The second battle of Aachen, October 7-21, 1944 (p.46-47)
Map 6. The Hurtgenwald, November 2-7, 1944 (The battle for Schmidt and Vossenack by the 28th Infantry Division) (p.50-51)
Map 7. Operation Queen: November 16 - December 9, 1944 (p.62)
Map 8. Operation Queen: November 16 - December 9, 1944 (US V Corps seizes Hurtgen and Grosshau in the Hurtgenwald) (p.70-71)
Map 9. The final push: VII Corps reaches the Roer. December 10-16, 1944 (p.87)
___________________________________________________________
(Douglas C. Dildy. Osprey Publishing, 2007)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.10-11)
Map 1. Deployment of Naval Forces for the Invasion of Norway, 2000 hrs, 8 April 1940 (p.31)
Map 2. The Invasion of Denmark, 9 April 1940 (p.35)
Map 3. Seaborne Assaults in Oslofjord, 9 April 1940 (p.38-39)
Map 4. Deployment of Royal Navy Forces to Counter the Invasion of Norway, 9 April 1940 (p.46)
Map 5. The German Capture of Southern and Central Norway, 12 April - 3 May 1940 (p.58)
Map 6. The Battles around Lillehammer, 20-24 April 1940 (p.62-63)
Map 7. Deployment of Forces for the Battle of Narvik, 10 May 1940 (p.74)
Map 8. Allied Forces Recapture Narvik, 12-28 May 1940 (p.78-79)
___________________________________________________________
(Peter Antill. Osprey Publishing, 2007)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.13-14)
Map 1. The Eastern Front, May 1942 (p.6)
Map 2. Operation "Blau", June-November 1942 (p.35)
Map 3. German Assault on Stalingrad, 14-26 September 1942 (p.52-53)
Map 4. German Assault on Stalingrad, 27 September - 7 October 1942 (p.60-61)
Map 5. German Assault on Stalingrad, 14-29 October 1942 (p.64-65)
Map 6. Operation "Uranus", 19 November - 12 December 1942 (p.72)
Map 7. Operation "Wintergewitter", 12-23 December 1942 & Operation "Koltso", 10 January - 2 February 1943 (p.77)
Map 8. Operation "Little Saturn", 16 December - 1 January 1943 (p.80)
___________________________________________________________
(Robert Kirchubel. Osprey Publishing, 2007)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.10)
Map 1. Strategic Overview (p.6)
Map 2. Boldin Counteroffensive (p.34)
Map 3. Minsk Encirclement, 24 June - 3 July 1941 (p.38-39)
Map 4. Timoshenko Counteroffensive (p.59)
Map 5. Viazma and Bryansk (p.67)
Map 6. Operation Typhoon (The plan of assault on Moscow) (p.70-71)
Map 7. German Advances towards Moscow (p.79)
___________________________________________________________
(Robert Forczyk. Osprey Publishing, 2008)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.15-16)
Map 1. Strategic dispositions, 24 September 1941 - 7 May 1942 (p.7)
Map 2. The German offensive, 17-26 December 1941 (p.10)
Map 3. Operation Trappenjagd, 8 May 1942 (p.37)
Map 4. Soviet defences in Sevastopol, 2 June 1942 (p.45)
Map 5. [Variant 2] Initial ground attack of the German LIV Corps on X-Day, 7 June 1942 (p.52-53)
Map 6. [Variant 2] XXX Corps attack at Chapel Hill, 13 June 1942 (p.64-65)
Map 7. The fight for Fort Maxim Gorky I, 17-25 June 1942 (p.68)
Map 8. [Variant 2] XXX and LIV Corps breach Sevastopol’s inner defensive line, 29 June 1942 (p.80-81)
___________________________________________________________
(Ken Ford. Osprey Publishing, 2008)
___________________________________________________________
Chronology (p.12-13)
Map 1. Operation Crusader: Eight Army’s advance to El Agheila and retreat back to the Gazala Line (p.6)
Map 2. Rommel’s attack on the Gazala Line (p.34)
Map 3. Rommel eliminates 150th Brigade’s defensive box (p.49)
Map 4. Operation Aberdeen: Ritchie’s attempt to crush Rommel’s forces in the Cauldron on 5 June (p.56)
Map 5. The decisive armoured actions of 12 and 13 June 1942. The British armour is comprehensively defeated by Rommel to the south-east of the Knightsbridge Box (p.68-69)
Map 6. Eighth Army’s withdrawal and Rommel’s attack on Tobruk (p.76)
Map 7. The action at Matruh, 26-28 June 1942. Auchinleck fights a delaying action before withdrawing to the El Alamein Line (p.86-87)
Map 8. Eighth Army’s retreat to the El Alamein Line (p.90)
___________________________________________________________
Note: Order of Battle (OBT) is previous name of Battle Orders Series (BTO).
___________________________________________________________
Maps are presented in the DjVu format. File size 30 Kb - 1 Mb.
___________________________________________________________
(Bruce Quarrie. Osprey Publishing, 1999)
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Map 1. Strategy in the West. The Allied breakout from Normandy was made on a “broad front”, but as their supply lines lengthened the advance slowed, giving the Germans time to regroup for “Herbstnebel” (p.5)
Map 2. Operation “Herbstnebel” planning. Hitler’s “grosse losung” and the “kleine losung” of his generals. In retrospect, the Fuhrer should have accepted the latter, less ambitious, plan (p.9)
Map 3. Operation “Herbstnebel” planning. Sixth Panzer Armee’s intended routes to the River Meuse. The most northern Rollbahn was reserved for LXVII Korps. Rollbahns A, B & C were assigned to 12 SS-Panzer Division while Rollbahns D & E were intended for 1 SS-Panzer Division. In fact, because “Hitler Jugend” got embroiled on the northern shoulder, Kampfgruppe “Peiper” used parts of C, D and E (p.10)
Map 4. Operation “Herbstnebel” planning. The railheads for troops and supplies for Sixth Panzer Armee. Keitel estimated that no fewer than 50 trains would be needed for ammunition alone. Many had to spend the daylight hours hiding in tunnels from Allied air attacks (p.14)
Map 5. Operation “Herbstnebel” planning. When finalizing “Herbstnebel”, the Germans knew that the U.S. First Army was thin on the ground, with divisions holding 20-30 mile fronts. They did not know precisely what lay in front of Sixth Panzer Armee, but estimated between five and seven divisions, including two armoured (p.18-19)
Map 6. 1 SS-Panzer Division Leibstandarte “Adolf Hitler”. 1 SS-Panzer Division’s Rollbahns. Planed to reach the River Meuse by 18/12/1944 (p.30)
Map 7. 12 SS-Panzer Division “Hitler Jugend”. 12 SS-Panzer Division’s Rollbahns. Planed to reach the River Meuse by 18/12/1944 (p.34)
Map 8. 3 Fallschirmjager Division’s Rollbahns (p.36)
Map 9. VI Panzer Armee, I SS-Panzer Korps. 277 Volksgrenadier Division and Kampfgruppe “Muller”, Krinkelt / Rocherath - December 16-18. The Defence of the “twin villages” of Krinkelt and Rocherath effectively denied I SS-Panzer Korps access to Rollbahn B and left I/12 SS-Panzer Regiment severely weakened (p.43)
Map 10. I SS-Panzer Korps. 277 Volksgrenadier Division and Kampfgruppe “Muller”, Krinkelt / Rocherath - December 16-18. U.S. and German deployments at Krinkelt and Rocherath on 18th December when Jurgensen’s tanks so nearly broke through (p.45)
Map 11. I SS-Panzer Korps. 12 Volksgrenadier Division and Kampfgruppe “Kuhlmann”, Bullingen / Dom Butgenbach - December 16-22. U.S. dispositions on the southern and western shoulder of Elsenborn ridge and the approach routes during successive attacks by 12 Volksgrenadier and 12 SS-Panzer Divisions. All failed to achieve a decisive breakthrough and the assault was abandoned (p.47)
Map 12. I SS-Panzer Korps. 12 Volksgrenadier Division and Kampfgruppe “Kuhlmann”, Bullingen / Dom Butgenbach - December 16-22. The deployment of the U.S. 26th Infantry Regiment around Dom Butgenbach and the German attacks on 21-22 December before the withdrawal of 12 SS-Panzer Division (p.49)
Map 13. I SS-Panzer Korps. Kampfgruppe “Peiper”, Losheim to La Gleize - December 16-24. Once he eventually got his Kampfgruppe out of Losheim, Peiper made good progress through Lanzerath and Honsfeld to the U.S. POL depot at Bullingen (p.53)
Map 14. I SS-Panzer Korps. Kampfgruppe “Peiper”, Losheim to La Gleize - December 16-24. Peiper’s circuitous route to Ligneuville, dictated by the terrain, took him through Baugnez where the massacre of American prisoners occurred (p.54)
Map 15. I SS-Panzer Korps. Kampfgruppe “Peiper”, Losheim to La Gleize - December 16-24. From Stavelot, where he missed the American fuel dump to the north, Peiper tried a two-pronged attack at Trois Ponts, which was thwarted by U.S. engineers (p.55)
Map 16. I SS-Panzer Korps. Kampfgruppe “Peiper”, Losheim to La Gleize - December 16-24. Peiper attempted to circumvent Stoumont through Cheneux but was blocked at Habiemont and failed later to break through from La Gleize to Stoumont (p.56)
Map 17. I SS-Panzer Korps. Kampfgruppe “Hansen’s” advance to Recht and Poteau, Recht / Poteau - December 17-19. Colonel Devine was ambushed near Kaiserbaracke. Poteau became of critical importance later during the evacuation of St. Vith (p.59)
Map 18. I SS-Panzer Korps. 150 Panzer Brigade, Malmedy - December 21-28. Skorzeny’s two Kampfgruppen tried attacking at three points in the Malmedy perimeter but failed to get past the paper mill or railway embankment (p.61)
Map 19. VI Panzer Armee, II SS-Panzer Korps. Kampfgruppe “Krag”, Salmchateau - December 21-23. Task Force “Jones” was straggling up the northern (eastern) bank of the Salm river with Kampfgruppe “Krag” blocking its path at Salmchateau and the Fuhrer Begleit Brigade pressing in from the east (p.71)
Map 20. II SS-Panzer Korps. 4 SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment “Der Fuhrer”, Baraque Fraiture - December 22-23. The crossroads at Baraque Fraiture with the village of Fraiture itself to the northeast. Vielsalm is off to the right. Manhay to the top left. Parker’s three 105 mm guns were in the center of the position, the company of paras in a semi-circle to the north and the AFVs in a rough circle. Weidinger’s attack came from three directions, leaving the survivors only one escape route to the northwest (p.73)
Map 21. II SS-Panzer Korps. 3 SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment “Deutschland” and 4 Kompanie, 2 SS-Panzer Regiment, Manhay / Grandmenil / Erezee - December 24-27. 2 SS-Panzer Division’s attacks from Odeigne and Fraiture, CCB’s withdrawal to the northwest and III/289th’s blocking position between Grandmenil and Erezee (p.75)
Map 22. VI Panzer Armee, LXVII Korps. Hitzfeld’s LXVII Korps “Rollbahns” (p.78)
Map 23. LXVII Korps. 326 Volksgrenadier Division, Hofen / Monschau - December 16-17. Hofen and Monschau lie in a bend of the River Rur, which produced a salient in the U.S. lines. V Corps’ attacks north and south towards the Rur and Urft dams were planned additionally to seal this off, but the German offensive pre-empted this. The two-pronged attacks by 326 Volksgrenadier Division were aimed at Hofen and Mutzenich (p.88)
Map 24. LXVII Korps. 3 Panzergrenadier Division, Elsenborn Ridge - December 19-22. The area between Monschau and Elsenborn where 3 Panzergrenadier Division launched successive unsuccessful attacks before it was transferred to the southern sector of the front (p.91)
Map 25. The Luftwaffe. II Jagdkorps, Luftflotte 3 airfields were thinly spread in a shallow curve fairly close to the front because of the fully laden aircrafts’ restricted range (p.94)
Map 26. Ardennes offensive battle map. Northern sector (p.97-98)
___________________________________________________________
(Bruce Quarrie. Osprey Publishing, 2000)
___________________________________________________________
Map 1. Operation “Herbstnebel” planning. What did the Germans know about Allied dispositions facing the central sector of their front? The answer is “not a lot” because the substitution of the raw 106th for the veteran 2nd Infantry Division in the Schnee Eifel had been carefully concealed. Patrols had ascertained that the line further south was only thinly defended. Allied command of the skies made aerial reconnaissance impossible and therefore no one at OKW knew what further reserves might lie just east of the river Meuse for a prompt riposte (p.8-9)
Map 2. V Panzer Armee. While Sixth Panzer Armee had five designated Rollbahns for its four Panzer divisions, Fifth Panzer Armee only had two for its three, and the southernmost fork of those encroached on Seventh Armee territory at Bastogne (p.12)
Map 3. V Panzer Armee, XLVII Panzer Korps. XLVII Korps was only assigned a single Rollbahn for its two Panzer divisions although this split into two around Bastogne and then again west of Ciergnon, debouching on the Meuse at Dinant and Givet. Capturing Bastogne itself was initially the responsibility of 26 Volksgrenadier Division alone (p.16)
Map 4. 2 Panzer Division “Wien”. The routes taken by 2 Panzer Division “Wien” diverted in a couple of places from its Rollbahn, skirting Bastogne for the following Volksgrenadiers to cope with, then splitting west of Champlon with Kampfgruppen “von Bohm” and “von Cochenhausen” taking different roads towards the Meuse at Dinant (p.20)
Map 5. XLVII Panzer Korps. II/3 Panzer and II/304 Panzergrenadier Regiments, Clervaux - December 16-18. Because of his inexperience in top command, von Lauchert relied heavily on his regimental commanders to use their own initiative. By a mixture of sidestepping and fiercely resisting American counter-attacks, they won the vital bridge at Clervaux (p.33)
Map 6. XLVII Panzer Korps. II/77 and I/78 Volksgrenadier Regiments, Hosingen - December 16-18. The unexpected resistance by a mere two companies of American infantry at Hosingen was only finally overcome after a 48-hour battle, and Kokott later acknowledged the determination of the defenders (p.36)
Map 7. XLVII Panzer Korps. 39 Fusilier Grenadier Regiment, Holzthum / Consthum - December 16-18. Kokott encountered at Holzthum and Consthum exactly the same type of determined opposition from heavily outnumbered forces which was to cause so many delays to Fifth Panzer Armee’s schedule (p.38)
Map 8. XLVII Panzer Korps. Kampfgruppe “von Bohm”, Bastogne Roadblocks - December 18-20. While the 101st Airborne Division was still beginning to deploy on 19 December, Bastogne lay wide open apart from a thin line of engineers and the roadblocks established by teams “Desobry”, “Cherry” and “O’Hara” (p.40)
Map 9. XLVII Panzer Korps. Kampfgruppen “von Fallois” and “901”, Wardin / Marvie - December 19-23. After a probing attack by a single Kompanie drove a company of the 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment out of Wardin on 19 December, but was then repulsed outside Marvie, Hauser threw the whole regiment in on the 23rd (p.42)
Map 10. XLVII Panzer Korps. 39 Fusilier Grenadier Regiment and Kampfgruppe “Kunkel”, Flamierge / Mande-St-Etienne - December 22-23. Before 39 Fusilier Grenadier Regiment’s successful attack at Flamierge on the evening of 23 December, the Germans were forced to watch tons of supplies being parachuted in to the Bastogne defenders (p.44)
Map 11. XLVII Panzer Korps. Kampfgruppe “Maucke” and 77 Volksgrenadier Regiment, Hemroulle / Champs - December 25. Although Kampfgruppe “Maucke” broke through the 401st Glider Infantry Regiment’s lines, and 77 Grenadier Regiment through the 502nd Parachute Regiment’s positions at Champs, there the attack ended (p.46)
Map 12. XLVII Panzer Korps. Kampfgruppen “von Bohm” and “von Cochenhausen”, Foy-Notre-Dame / Celles - December 24-26. Foy-Notre-Dame, where Kampfgruppe “von Bohm” was halted by tanks from the British 29th Armoured Brigade, lies only four miles east of the bridge at Dinant. Kampfgruppe “von Cochenhausen” was destroyed around Celles by a combination of the attacks by CCB of 2nd Armored Division and Allied fighter-bombers (p.49)
Map 13. XLVII Panzer Korps. Kampfgruppe “von Poschinger”, Rochefort - December 23-24. If 2 Panzer Division had not been stalled at Celles, Panzer Lehr’s capture of Rochefort could have got both divisions across the Meuse (p.52)
Map 14. XLVII Panzer Korps. Kampfgruppe “Holtmeyer”, Custinne - December 25. Advancing from Rochefort in daylight across relatively open ground offering little cover from allied fighter-bombers, Holtmeyer’s relief column in truth stood little chance of success (p.54)
Map 15. XLVII Panzer Korps. Fuhrer Begleit Brigade and 3 Panzergrenadier Division, Sibret - December 30. The engagement at Sibret on 30 December was a classic “encounter” battle with both sides advancing towards each other along the same roads at the same time (p.56)
Map 16. V Panzer Armee, LVIII Panzer Korps. The Rollbahn assigned to LVIII Panzer Korps was based on the ability of 116 Panzer Division to use the bridge at Ouren, and did not approach Samree or Hotton. If the bridge had been usable, the division could easily have been through Marche before the U.S. VII Corps even began deploying (p.59)
Map 17. LVIII Panzer Korps. Kampfgruppen “Schumann” and “Bayer”, Ouren - December 16-18. If Walter Kruger had deployed 560 Volksgrenadier Division to take Ouren and 116 Panzer to their south, the tanks could have been on the banks of the Meuse while 2 Panzer Division was still struggling at Bastogne (p.67)
Map 18. LVIII Panzer Korps. 60 Panzergrenadier Regiment and Kampfgruppe “Happich”, Samree - December 20. 116 Panzer Division’s swift victories at Samree and Dochamps were overshadowed by its further need for redeployment after being baulked next day east of Hotton (p.69)
Map 19. LVIII Panzer Korps. Kampfgruppe “Bayer”, Hotton - December 21. The capture of Hotton would not just have given 116 Panzer Division quick access to Marche, but also forced U.S. forces to pull back from Manhay - Grandmenil - Erezee, opening the road for 2 SS-Panzer Division (p.71)
Map 20. LVIII Panzer Korps. 156 Panzergrenadier Regiment, Marche / Verdenne - December 24-26. U.S. VII Corps’ deployment of the 84th Infantry Division west of Hotton while 116 Panzer Division was struggling to redeploy ended all von Waldenburg’s hopes of reaching the Meuse (p.73)
Map 21. V Panzer Armee, LXVI Korps. The Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armee Korps were so redeployed once the Meuse was unattainable and Bastogne became the objective, that they bear little resemblance to those on 16 December (p.77)
Map 22. LXVI Korps. Fuhrer Begleit Brigade. Original German map showing the successive probes by the Fuhrer Begleit Brigade at the defences of St. Vith over 18/24 December (p.83)
Map 23. LXVI Korps. 293 and 294 Volksgrenadier Regiments, Schnee Eifel / Schonberg - December 16-19. Hoffman-Schonborn’s outflanking pincer manoeuvre in the Schnee Eifel at the outset of the campaign gave German forces their greatest victory in the Ardennes - and it was accomplished with lowly Volksgrenadiers! (p.85)
Map 24. LXVI Korps. 183, 294 and 295 Volksgrenadier Regiments and Fuhrer Begleit Brigade, St. Vith - December 17-23. After 18 Volksgrenadier Division captured Schonberg, their elation at victory over the U.S. 106th Infantry Division was diminished by the unexpectedly fierce opposition just west of St. Vith (p.86)
Map 25. LXVI Korps. 183, 294 and 295 Volksgrenadier Regiments and Fuhrer Begleit Brigade. The final capture of St. Vith by 294 Volksgrenadier Regiment after fighting its way through well dug-in enemy forces on higher ground contradicts standard military theory, which only proves that the “rule books” have to be thrown away sometimes! The subsequent exploitation by the Fuhrer Begleit Brigade, although it succeeded in completing the annihilation of Task Force “Jones” at Salmchateau, failed to accomplish the destruction of the U.S. 7th Armored Division as hoped, with severe repercussions when First Army counter-attacked in January 1945 (p.89)
Map 26. V Panzer Armee, XXXIX Panzer Korps. 1 SS-Panzer Division and 167 Volksgrenadier Division, Lutrebois - December 30. On the same day that XLVII Korps’ assault towards Sibret from the northwest ran headlong into 11th Armored Division, XXXIX Korps was equally unable to break the Bastogne corridor from the southeast (p.95)
Map 27. Ardennes Offensive Battle Map. Central Sector (p.97-98)
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(Bruce Quarrie. Osprey Publishing, 2001)
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Map 1. Brandenberger knew that the forces immediately facing his Seventh Armee were relatively weak, but at the same time realized that they would probably not be brushed aside easily, given the nature of the terrain and the limited mobility as well as lack of armoured backup of his own troops. The biggest problem he faced was the strong American artillery positions emplaced on high ground and able to fire with relative impunity on his bridging sites over the Our and Sauer, delaying any backup to his infantry (p.8-9)
Map 2. VII Armee, LXXXV Korps. After 5 Fallschirm and 352 Volksgrenadier Divisions crossed the river Our, forcing the U.S. 109th Regiment to fall steadily back to the southwest and separating it from its parent 28th Infantry Division, the two divisions of LXXXV Korps found themselves increasingly separated as well by natural barrier of the river Sure. By December 22 they were, in effect, fighting totally separate battles and it was as much to plug the dangerous vacuum in between them as to reinforce them that Model released 9 and 79 Volksgrenadier Divisions and the Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade from reserve. Then, to shorten the over-extended Korps’ front, he brought the LIII Korps staff up from Trier to take over command of Seventh Armee’s northern flank (p.19)
Map 3. LXXXV Korps. 14 Fallschirm Regiment, Hoscheid / Wiltz / Sibret - December 16-21. The advance of 5 Fallschirm Division’s two leading regiments over December 17/19 with 352 Volksgrenadier Division to their south and 26 Volksgrenadier Division to the north. The 14 Regiment’s assault on Wiltz itself was an unscheduled “private venture” (p.29)
Map 4. LXXXV Korps. 15 Fallschirm Regiment, Vianden to Warnach - December 16-21. The first phase of 15 Fallschirm Regiment’s advance separated Companies F and G of II/109th Infantry Battalion from the rest of the regiment, forcing them to fight their way out back to Diekirch, while on the paras’ left flank 352 Volksgrenadier Division was involved in its own battles at Fuhren, Longsdorf and Tandel. After this, Groschke’s regiment, once its transport got across the Our at Roth, made almost record time reaching its objective at Martelange (p.32)
Map 5. LXXXV Korps. 915 Volksgrenadier Regiment, Fuhren - December 16-19. After an initially promising start which drove a wedge between the American II/ and III/109th Battalions, 915 Volksgrenadier Regiment’s attack stalled at Longsdorf and Tandel in the face of counter-attacks, but once the defenders in Fuhren were subdued and 914 Regiment was able to add its weight to the centre of the division’s attack, the Americans were forced back to Diekirch (p.35)
Map 6. LXXXV Korps. 916 Volksgrenadier Regiment, Hosdorf / Diekirch - December 16-20. After finally achieving a breakthrough on the northern flank of the U.S. III/109th on the heights west of Hosdorf, 916 Volksgrenadier Regiment pursued them back to Diekirch and ultimately to Ettelbruck (p.37)
Map 7. LXXXV Korps. 915 Volksgrenadier Regiment, Ettelbruck / Grosbous - December 20-25. 915 Volksgrenadier Regiment’s leading two battalions were isolated by the U.S. III Corps’ rapid advance on December 22 and although the men put up a determined resistance, their plight was hopeless (p.39)
Map 8. LXXXV Korps. 13 and 15 Fallschirm Regiment, Warnach / Bigonville - December 22-24. The twin battles for Warnach and Bigonville over December 23-24 were almost copybook exercises, each following a very similar pattern. In both cases the Fallschirmjager proved far more stubborn than their training and experience would have indicated but, without any tanks of their own, at the end of the day they were overwhelmed (p.41)
Map 9. LXXXV Korps. I/208 and I/212 Volksgrenadier Regiments, Eschdorf / Heiderscheid - December 24. Assembling his leading two battalions just to the north of Eschdorf late on December 23 while the remainder of 79 Volksgrenadier Division was concentrated around Bourscheid to the east, Alois Weber launched his attack on Heiderscheid before dawn on Christmas Eve but had his men blown away by American Artillery fire (p.44)
Map 10. LXXXV Korps. 266 and II/212 Volksgrenadier Regiments, Welscheid / Kehmen - December 23 - January 1. The excellent defensive nature of the landscape in what the Americans called the “Bourscheid Triangle” can clearly be seen, but Weber’s battle here still denied Patton the swift victory he had hoped for (p.46)
Map 11. LXXXV Korps. 208 and I/212 Volksgrenadier Regiments, Ringelerhof - December 24-30. The map shows the overall situation between December 25 and 30 with Weber’s final attack against Ringelerhof arrowed. What is surprising seen at this scale is that McBride made no attempt to exploit the central Kehmen route from the west. The explanation is that he had lost two battalions of his 318th Regiment to reinforce 4th Armored Division, and third was tied down at Ettelbruck to the southeast (p.48)
Map 12. LXXXV Korps. 14 Fallschirm Regiment, Villers-la-Bonne-Eau - December 30 - January 1. XXXIX Korps assault southeast of Bastogne achieved a small amount of local success at Lutrebois and Villers-la-Bonne-Eau but failed to dent the lines of the U.S. 35th Infantry Division significantly (p.50)
Map 13. VII Armee. LXXX Korps. The LXXX Korps’ zone of operation to the northeast of Luxembourg City is characterized by some of the most rugged terrain in the Ardennes, which obviously helped the defenders more than the attackers. In the south, 212 Volksgrenadier Division’s assault reached as far west as Scheidgen but the stubborn American resistance in Echternach itself and the villages of Osweiler and Dickweiler tied up a large part of the division’s strength - and it had only two regiments in the line. In the northern sector, 276 Volksgrenadier Division captured Mullerthal and Beaufort, surrounding the U.S. 60th Armored Infantry Battalion and forcing the Americans to withdraw the troublesome artillery batteries from behind Haller, but the division lacked the strength for its subsequent attacks towards Medernach and Christnach to succeed (p.55)
Map 14. LXXX Korps. 986 Volksgrenadier Regiment, Wallendorf / Savelborn - December 16-18. Although its initial progress was slow due to flanking fire from American troops north of the Sure, 986 Volksgrenadier Regiment helped to encircle the 60th Armored Infantry Battalion and later successfully ambushed the task forces sent to its relief (p.64)
Map 15. LXXX Korps. 988 Volksgrenadier Regiment, Dillingen / Beaufort - December 16-18. While 988 Volksgrenadier Regiment was able to penetrate the 60th Armored Infantry Battalion’s lines and surround them, American artillery fire prevented any more significant advance until nightfall on December 17 (p.66)
Map 16. LXXX Korps. 987 Volksgrenadier Regiment, Mullerthal - December 17-25. Even though 987 Volksgrenadier Regiment made no serious attempt to break out from Mullerthal, their presence in the Schwarz Ernst gorge tied down a significant number of American tanks and infantry and caused them heavy casualties (p.67)
Map 17. LXXX Korps. 423 Volksgrenadier Regiment, Berdorf / Lauterborn - December 16-20. The swift assault by I/ and II/423 Volksgrenadier Regiment completely cut off the small American garrisons in Berdorf and Lauterborn, forcing relief task forces to rescue the survivors (p.70)
Map 18. LXXX Korps. 320 Volksgrenadier Regiment and 212 Fusilier Bataillon, Echternach Sector - December 16-19. The attack by 320 Volksgrenadier Regiment was delayed by the necessity to move the bridging site from Echternach to Edingen and although Echternach was finally taken on December 19, all efforts to capture Dickweiler and Osweiler failed (p.72)
Map 19. VII Armee, LIII Korps. When von Rothkirch assembled his staff at Wiltz on December 22, 5 Fallschirm Division was thinly spread in a long line from the Neufchateau - Bastogne road in the west to Liefrange in the east and seriously delayed 4th Armored Division’s advance. The Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade moved into the vacuum on its left but was itself over-extended on the line Arsdorf - Bourscheid. By the time 9 Volksgrenadier Division arrived at the end of the month, Bastogne had already been relieved and Patton’s men were across the Sure and pressing towards Wiltz. The map also shows Generalleutnant Karl Decker’s XXXIX Panzer Korps’ attack at Lutrebois and Villers-la-Bonne-Eau on December 30 in which 14 Fallschirm Regiment took part (p.75)
Map 20. LIII Korps. Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade, Arsdorf / Eschdorf / Grevils-Bresil - December 23-25. The Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade was unable to deploy effectively in the Eschdorf area and, because it lacked its artillery and grenadier battalions, was unable to resist the powerful III Corps’ onslaught to the south of the Sure (p.81)
Map 21. LIII Korps. Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade, Heiderscheidergrund - December 25-27. The battle along the banks of the river Sure around Heiderscheidergrund was confused, with elements of two American divisions involved, Major von Courbiere trying to regroup the Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade in a defensible position which was soon outflanked, and the supporting battalions of 79 Volksgrenadier Division moving through their lines to new positions around Bourscheid for the ill-fated assault on Ringelerhof (p.83)
Map 22. LIII Korps. Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade and 9 Volksgrenadier Division, Kaundorf / Wiltz - December 27-30. Although the town of Wiltz was only four miles (6.5 km) away as the crow flies once the U.S. 26th Infantry Division established itself on the north band of the Sure, the combined efforts of the Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade and the freshly arrived 9 Volksgrenadier Division made those miles very long indeed (p.85)
Map 23. I Armee, Operation “Nordwind”. Considering the expenditure of manpower, the gains made by First Armee during Operation “Nordwind” were extremely modest. The subsequent attacks through Wissembourg and Gambsheim threatened Haguenau but even the arrival of XXXIX Panzer Korps proved insufficient to do more than dent the American and French lines. Similarly, Nineteenth Armee’s sortie out of the Colmar pocket never really threatened Strasbourg (p.89)
Map 24. By January 3, when the Allied counter-offensive began in earnest, and certainly over the period January 2-5, the Heeresgruppe B perimeter was already shrinking drastically. Except to the immediate southeast of Bastogne, Seventh Armee had been driven back behind its start line; in the north, Sixth Panzer Armee had been forced back well behind the Rur, while in the centre Fifth Panzer Armee’s remaining “bulge” was threatened by assaults from north and south aimed at eliminating it completely at Houffalize (p.93)
Map 25. Ardennes Offensive Battle Map, Southern Sector (p.97-98)
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(Bruce Quarrie. Osprey Publishing, 2001)
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Map 1. Seen at this scale, the German concentration for Operation “Herbstnebel” and the weakness of Hodges’ First Army in the Ardennes are clearly apparent. When the attack began, Patton’s XII Corps (Eddy) was preparing to launch its offensive through the relatively weak sector of the West Wall, around Saarbrucken. Instead, it was transferred to the Echternach front while III Corps (Millikin) went to the relief of Bastogne. XV Corps (Haislip) then took over the XII Corps’ sector. XX Corps (Walker), although still apart of Third Army, became, in effect, the left flank formation of Devers’ 6th Army Group until the crisis was resolved (p.8)
Map 2. The Allies believed that German forces east of the river Sauer were thinly spread and low grade, but the sadly depleted 4th Infantry Division’s 12th Regiment and CCA of 9th Armored Division were in fact each opposed by a full Volksgrenadier division. Similarly, to their north the 109th Regiment of the 28th Infantry Division was faced by a Volksgrenadier and a Fallschirmjager division, shortly to be reinforced by a Panzer brigade (p.10-11)
Map 3. U.S. Third Army. The relief of Bastogne. At this scale, it is impossible to show German dispositions without obscuring geographical features referred to in the text. Where relevant, these are shown in the following III Corps’ battles maps but, broadly speaking, the whole top half of the map from the rivers Wark and Sure north could be painted red, apart from the enclave of the besieged forces in Bastogne. The routes taken by CCA and CCB of 4th Armored Division are shown as solid blue lines. The route of CCR to Bigonville is shown as dashes, and its diversion towards Sibret via Neufchateau, which resulted in re-establishing contact with McAuliffe’s garrison, is shown dotted. The operating areas of Millikin’s III Corps’ other two divisions, 26th and 80th Infantry, are also shown but not dated, to avoid confusion (p.15)
Map 4. U.S. Third Army, U.S. III Corps. CCA, 4th Armored Division, Martelange / Warnach - December 22-24. The stumbling block over the river Sure at Martelange is evident, and it is surprising that the CO of the German 5 Fallschirm Division did not put up a more stubborn resistance here. Warnach, as can be seen, was on the flank of CCA’s rout, and, because of the strength of German forces in and around it, could not simply be bypassed as Patton instructed (p.37)
Map 5. U.S. III Corps. CCB, 4th Armored Division, Chaumont - December 23-25. Surrounded by dense woods, the little village of Chaumont lies in a saucer-like depression. The map shows CCB’s attack and 5 Fallschirm Division’s counter-attack on December 23 (p.40)
Map 6. U.S. III Corps. CCR, 4th Armored Division, Bigonville - December 23-24. Because of the constricting nature of the ground, making it impossible to simply bypass Bigonville, and the determined German resistance, it took Wendell Blanchard’s CCR 24 hours to advance a single mile (p.42)
Map 7. U.S. III Corps. CCR, 4th Armored Division, Remonville / Clochimont / Assenois - December 25-26. Illustrating the tortuous route taken by CCR, the map shows the command assembled for the assault on Clochimont with the “C Team” poised for the dash through Assenois to Bastogne (p.44)
Map 8. U.S. III Corps. 104th and 328th Infantry Regiments, 26th Infantry Division, Grevils-Bresil / Grosbous / Eschdorf - December 22-25. The situation on December 24. While the 104th Regiment remained engaged against 915 Volksgrenadier Regiment around Grosbous and I/ and III/328th hit a snag at Grevils-Bresil, II/328th hooked around to attack Eschdorf but ran into further heavy opposition from the Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade (p.45)
Map 9. U.S. III Corps. 134th Infantry and 51st Armored Infantry Regiments, Lutrebois - December 29-30. While Baade’s 137th and 320th Infantry Regiments had their own hard-fought battles at Villers-la-Bonne-Eau and Harlange, the main assault fell on Lutrebois, but was checked with heavy German casualties (p.48)
Map 10. U.S. III Corps. CCA and CCB, 6th Armored Division, Arloncourt / Mageret / Wardin - December 31 - January 5. The situation on January 2, 1945, after Robert Grow committed CCR to the 6th Armored Division’s assault. The original line of advance was bounded on the south by the river Wiltz, and on the north by the Bastogne - Bourcy railway line, but was then broadened to embrace Wardin so as to, hopefully, make contact with the 35th Infantry Division. The strong German dispositions on the flanks ruled out a straight thrust through Longvilly (p.50)
Map 11. U.S. III Corps. 101st and 104th Infantry Regiments, 26th Infantry Division, from the Sure to the Wiltz - December 26 - January 2. The situation on December 27 looked promising, with the leading battalions of the 101st and 104th Regiments in an apparently strong position to recapture Wiltz, but the appearance was deceptive, and it would take another three weeks to cover those last couple of miles (p.53)
Map 12. U.S. Third Army, U.S. XII Corps. Company E, 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, Echternach - December 16-20. Captain Paul Dupuis’ Company E, II/12th RCT, was almost totally isolated in Echternach as German forces swept around the town. He considered he was under orders to stay put, even when armoured task forces offered to cover his withdrawal. He was ultimately overwhelmed (p.69)
Map 13. U.S. XII Corps. Companies B and F, 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, Berdorf - December 16-19. Berdorf was the most northerly outpost of Colonel Chance’s 12th Infantry Regiment and, although at one point it was almost completely cut off, the defenders tied down a whole German battalion for four vital days (p.71)
Map 14. U.S. XII Corps. Companies A and G, 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, Lauterborn - December 16-20. Although surrounded early in the battle, the men of Companies A and G of the 12th Infantry Regiment managed to hold out in Lauterborn until help arrived and only evacuated their position when all hope for the garrison in Echternach was abandoned (p.73)
Map 15. U.S. XII Corps. Companies I, L and C, 12th Infantry Regiment and Company F, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, Dickweiler / Osweiler - December 16-20. Although they were surrounded early in the battle, it proved possible to get sufficient reinforcements to Companies I and L in Dickweiler and Osweiler so that the whole German effort in the south was crippled (p.75)
Map 16. U.S. XII Corps. 318th and 319th Infantry Regiments, 80th Infantry Division, Ettelbruck - December 22-24. With the 26th Infantry Division on its left, the 319th RCT relieved the 109th in Vichten and, bypassing Merzig, hit the tail of 915 Volksgrenadier Regiment in flank, before heading towards Heiderscheid and Kehmen. Merzig was later captured by III/319th. The 318th, advancing in column alongside the river Alzette, reached Ettelbruck at the same time as 914 Volksgrenadier Regiment, resulting in a prolonged battle (p.77)
Map 17. U.S. XII Corps. 319th Infantry Regiment, 80th Infantry Division, Heiderscheid - December 23-24. The situation at nightfall on December 23. The three battalions of the 319th are deployed in a triangle with a single company of the 3rd Battalion at Heiderscheidergrund. The two battalions from the 26th Infantry Division attacking Eschdorf are on the left (p.79)
Map 18. U.S. XII Corps. 317th Infantry Regiment, 80th Infantry Division, “The Bourscheid Triangle” - December 23-25. The German defence of the “Bourscheid Triangle” proved too strong for the 317th RCT but, although it lost heavily at Kehmen, Welscheid and on Burden ridge, the opposing 79 Volksgrenadier Division’s assault on Ringelerhof was equally fruitless (p.81)
Map 19. U.S. XII Corps. Task Forces “Chamberlain” and “Luckett”, Breitweiler / Mullerthal - December 17-20. The problem the various American task forces - and 5th Infantry Division later in the day - had getting past Mullerthal are easily explained by the nature of the Schwarz Ernst gorge. What remains a mystery is why the Germans did not exploit it earlier (p.83)
Map 20. U.S. XII Corps. 10th Infantry Regiment, 5th Infantry Division, Michelshof - December 22-26. The advance of 10th Infantry Regiment’s 1st and 2nd Battalions either side of Michelshof, towards Lauterborn, was seriously delayed by resistance in the woods which look insignificant on the map but were full of determined Voksgrenadiers (p.86)
Map 21. U.S. XII Corps. 8th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division and 11th Infantry Regiment, 5th Infantry Division, Berdorf / Haller - December 22-27. The situation on December 25 showing the positions of the 11th Infantry Regiment’s three battalions west of the Schwarz Ernst gorge, and those of the 2nd Regiment to the east. The German forces opposing them appear much stronger than they, in fact, were by this stage (p.88)
Map 22. 6th Army Group. While Guillaume’s 3e Division Algerien concentrated on the defence of Strasbourg, the remainder of de Lattre’s Premiere Armee Francaise got on with the reduction of the German Nineteenth Armee’s two Korps in the Colmar pocket. Devers assigned the 5th and 12th Armored Divisions to assist the three infantry divisions in Frank Milburn’s XXI Corps from Seventh Army, which were co-operating with the French during the operation (p.91)
Map 23. The unbroken line on the map shows the front line 24 hours into the Allied offensive. The slow progress initially is clearly indicated by the heavy broken line, which shows the situation on January 12. The final dotted line marks the situation at the end of the month (p.93)
Map 24. Ardennes Offensive Battle Map, Southern Sector (p.97-98)
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(Gordon Rottman. Osprey Publishing, 2004)
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Chronology (p.91-92)
Abbreviations and linear measurements (p.94)
Map 1. The strategic situation, late-1943, at the beginning of the Allied offensive. In August 1943, the Solomon Islands were the primary focus of early South and Southwest Pacific operations. The boundary line between the two commands was longitude 159 degrees East passing though the center of Santa Isabel Island and the Russell Islands (both of which are in the Solomon Islands). The Solomons were occupied by the Japanese in stages between March and May 1942 (p.5)
Map 2. The 4th Marines’ defense of Corregidor, May 5-6, 1942 (p.61)
Map 3. The military map symbols used by the Marine Corps in World War II (p.62)
Map 4. The Solomon Islands, late-1943 (p.64)
Map 5. Guadalcanal, D-Day and D+1, August 7-8, 1942 (p.68)
Map 6. Battle of the Tenaru, August 21, 1942. Note that G/2/I was Battalion Reserve. C/I Engineer Battalion was attached to 2/I (p.69)
Map 7. Henderson Field perimeter on Guadalcanal: the Battle of Edson’s Ridge, September 12-14, 1942 (p.72)
Map 8. Guadalcanal, August 1943 (p.73)
Map 9. The Matanikau Offensive, Guadalcanal, October 7-9, 1942 (p.77)
Map 10. A situation sketch map prepared by the Intelligence Sector, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines portraying the enemy situation west of the Matanikau River, Guadalcanal, on October 28, 1942 (p.77)
Map 11. New Georgia operations, June 21 - July 5, 1943 (p.80)
Map 12. Vella Lavella occupation, August 15 - October 16, 1943 (p.80)
Map 13. Bougainville, October 1943 (p.84)
Map 14. Cape Torokina, Bougainville: D-Day, November 1, 1943 (p.84)
Map 15. Inland defense line expansion, Cape Torokina, November 1 - December 15, 1943 (p.85)
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(Steven J. Zaloga. Osprey Publishing, 2004)
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Map 1. Offensive operations in France. Breakout and pursuit. July 25 - August 25, 1944 (p.51)
Map 2. Breakthrough operations. 9th Armored Division at Remagen, March 1945 (p.55)
Map 3. Seizing key terrain. 3rd Armored Division at Paderborn, April 1, 1945 (p.58)
Map 4. Regaining the initiative. 6th Armored Division at Bastogne, January 1-3, 1945 (p.59)
Map 5. Restoring the initiative. 2nd Armored Division at Ubach, October 3-7, 1944 (p.62)
Map 6. Overcoming an unprepared defense. 4th Armored Division in the Saar-Palatinate Triangle, March 12-21, 1945 (p.63)
Map 7. Attack on a prepared position. 6th Armored Division at the Vianden Bulge, February 20-23, 1945 (p.65)
Map 8. Attacks on enemy armored units. 4th Armored Division at Arracourt, September 19, 1944 (p.65)
Map 9. Attacks on enemy armored units. 2nd Armored Division at Celles, Belgium, December 1944 (p.68)
Map 10. Armor in the defense. 7th Armored Division at St. Vith, December 17-23, 1945 (p.69)
Map 11. Small unit tactics. 6th Armored Division captures Muhlhausen, April 4, 1945 (p.72)
Map 12. Small unit tactics. TF Abrams at Singling, December 6, 1944 (p.73)
Map 13. Small unit tactics. 4th Armored Division at Singling, December 6, 1944 (p.73)
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(Bruce Quarrie. Osprey Publishing, 2004)
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Glossary (p.89-92)
German ranks with allied equivalents (p.94)
Map 1. Waalhaven and Rotterdam (p.69)
Map 2. Dordrecht and Moerdijk (p.72)
Map 3. Plan of Eben Emael (Belgian fortress in between Liege and Maastricht, near the Albert Canal, defending the Belgian-German border) (p.73)
Map 4. Veldwezelt, Vroenhoven, Canne and Eben Emael (p.73)
Map 5. Korinthos (p.76)
Map 6. Maleme (p.77)
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(Gordon L. Rottman. Osprey Publishing, 2005)
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Chronology (p.91-92)
Abbreviations and linear measurements (p.94)
Map 1. The Southern Army’s pre-invasion deployment, December 1941. Only units assigned to Southern Army are indicated (p.11)
Map 2. The Southern Operations plan (p.15)
Map 3. Maizuru 2d SNLF landing sites: Lae, Huon Gulf, northeast New Guinea, March 8, 1942 (p.20)
Map 4. The Port Moresby invasion plan, May 9, 1942. Even in an amphibious assault, the doctrine of flanking and enveloping the enemy can be seen (p.21)
Map 5. Examples of envelopment and encirclement tactics (p.40)
Map 6. The main Philippine landings, December 10, 1941 - May 3, 1942 (p.59)
Map 7. Luzon operations, December 10, 1941 - February 26, 1942 (p.62)
Map 8. The Lingayen Bay landing, and the drive south to Cabanatuan (p.63)
Map 9. Bataan operations, Phase 1, early-January to late-February 1942. The US/Filipino positions shown (in olive green) are based on Japanese assessments of their deployment, and are not necessarily the same as reported by the Luzon Force (p.66)
Map 10. Bataan operation, Phase 2, late-February to early-May 1942. The US/Filipino positions shown are based on Japanese assessments of their deployment, and are not necessarily the same as reported by the Luzon Force (p.67)
Map 11. The assault of Corregidor, May 5-6, 1942 (p.70)
Map 12. Borneo operations, December 12, 1941 - February 13, 1942 (p.74)
Map 13. Timor operations, February 1942. The Ito detachment occupied Koepang, Dili and Malaca. It was relieved by the 48th Division between October and December 1942 (p.75)
Map 14. Sumatra operations, February 6 - March 17, 1942 (p.78)
Map 15. Java operations, March 1-9, 1942 (p.79)
Map 16. South Seas operations, January 14 - July 21, 1942 (p.85)
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(Steven J. Zaloga. Osprey Publishing, 2005)
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Map 1. Tanks in amphibious assault - Omaha Beach. The plans for Operation Neptune included the support of both regimental combat teams at Omaha Beach by one tank battalion, with the 741st Tank Battalion supporting the 16th RCT on the eastern side and the 743rd supporting the 116th RCT on the western side. Each battalion deployed two companies with DD tanks and one company with M4 and M4A1 medium tanks with wading trunks. The DD tanks were supposed to be launched from 5000 to 6000 yards offshore, and to be the first US troops ashore five minutes before H-Hour, to be followed five minutes later by the remaining tank companies landing from LCTs. As it transpired, most of the DD tanks from the 741st Tank Battalion ware swamped at sea, and the 743rd Tank Battalion’s two DD companies landed directly on shore from their LCTs (p.47)
Map 2. Tanks in amphibious assault - Operation Dragoon. Although less well known than the amphibious assault in Normandy, tank battalions also supported the landings on the French Riviera on August 15, 1944, when the US Seventh Army invaded southern France. Each of the assaulting divisions was assigned a tank battalion, with each of these battalions having about a company of DD tanks. The eight DD tanks of the 756th Tank Battalion with Alpha Force disembarked about 2500 yards from the beach and swam to shore, with one being sunk by wash from a passing landing craft and another by an underwater mine. Two tanks from this unit were involved in fighting against German pillboxes. Of the 12 DD tanks with the 191st Tank Battalion in the center with Delta Force, four swam ashore from 75 yards at H-hour (0800 hrs), while the remaining eight were landed from their LCTs directly on shore. Of the 16 DD tanks of the 753rd Tank Battalion with Camel Force, eight swam ashore in the initial wave and the remaining eight arrived in the early afternoon, and were landed directly on shore. There was a skirmish between these tanks and a German self-propelled gun, which was knocked out. There was significantly less resistance on these beaches than at Normandy, but mines disabled at least five tanks (p.49)
Map 3. Bocage busting - 2nd Infantry Division and the 741st Tank Battalion, Operation Cobra, July 26, 1944 (p.52)
Map 4. Attacking a fortified zone - 11th Infantry Regiment and 735th Tank Battalion vs. Ft. Driant, October 3, 1944 (p.56)
Map 5. Armor in the defense - 38th Infantry Regiment and Co. C, 741st Tank Battalion, vs. 12th SS-Panzer Division at Krinkelt - Rocherath (p.61)
Map 6. Armor in river-crossing operations - 771st Tank Battalion and 84th Division crossing the Roer at Linnich, February 22-23, 1945 (p.64)
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Scouts, Raiders, Rangers and Reconnaissance Units
(Gordon L. Rottman. Osprey Publishing, 2005)
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Chronology (p.90-91)
Abbreviations and linear measurements (p.93-94)
Map 1. The strategic situation in the Pacific Theater, 1942-45 (p.5)
Map 2. The fighting in the Aleutian Islands, Alaska, 1942-43 (p.25)
Map 3. Amphibious Reconnaissance Company, VAC on Apamama Atoll, Gilbert Islands, November 21-25, 1943 (p.29)
Map 4. Special Service Unit No.1’s pre-landing reconnaissance missions on New Guinea. Landings prior to September 1943 are not shown (p.36)
Map 5. 5217th/1st Reconnaissance Battalion’s penetration of the Philippines, December 1942 - October 1944 (p.40)
Map 6. The Alamo Scouts’ liberation of the civilian internee camp at Cape Oransbari, Netherlands New Guinea, October 4-5, 1944 (p.44)
Map 7. The Solomon Islands, 1942-43 (p.48)
Map 8. 1st and 2nd Raider Battalion operations on Guadalcanal and Florida Islands, August - December 1942 (p.50)
Map 9. The Tulagi assault, August 7-8, 1942 (p.51)
Map 10. Raider-Parachute Battalion on Edson’s Ridge, September 13, 1942 (p.55)
Map 11. The Matanikau action, September 24-27, 1942 (p.58)
Map 12. The Matanikau offensive, October 7-9, 1942 (p.59)
Map 13. The raid on Makin Island by 2d Raider Battalion, August 17-18, 1942 (p.62)
Map 14. 2d Raider Battalion’s “Long Patrol” on Guadalcanal, November 4 - December 4, 1942 (p.63)
Map 15. The seizure of the Russell Islands, February 21, 1943 (p.66)
Map 16. The seizure of Viru Harbor by 4th Raider Battalion (less elements), June 28 - July 1, 1943 (p.67)
Map 17. The seizure of Wickham Anchorage by 4th Raider Battalion (-), June 30 - July 3, 1943 (p.70)
Map 18. Northern Landing Force’s campaign on Dragon’s Peninsula, July 5-20, 1943 (p.71)
Map 19. The battle for Piva Trail, New Britain, November 8-9, 1943 (p.74)
Map 20. The Attu Island assault (Plan E), November 11-15, 1943 (p.75)
Map 21. 6th Ranger Battalion operations, Leyte Gulf, October 17-28, 1944. The objectives of each phase are numbered (p.83)
Map 22. The Cabanatuan Prison Camp rescue, 6th Ranger Battalion, January 28-31, 1945 (p.86)
Map 23. The raid on Cabanatuan Prison Camp, 1945 hours, January 30, 1945 (p.87)
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(Gordon L. Rottman. Osprey Publishing, 2005)
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Chronology (p.90-91)
Abbreviations and linear measurements (p.94)
Map 1. The Southeastern Area was under the operational control of the IJN. Following the US invasion of Guadalcanal, the IJA’s presence in the area vastly increased. The Japanese airfields, and seaplane and naval bases are shown on this map (p.5)
Map 2. The Japanese defenses at Gona, Papua, November-December 1942, which formed the western anchor of the Gona-Buna beach strongholds. The defense in depth provides three lines of defense, beach defenses protecting the rear, and flank defenses. There are also hundreds of foxholes and dugouts, which are not shown at this scale (p.28)
Map 3. This is a simplified diagram of a January 1943 Japanese strongpoint in the Central Sector of South Giruwa, 2.5 miles south of the coast. The Allies designated in “Perimeter Q”. The surrounding ground was swampy, and could be up to waist deep after rain (p.29)
Map 4. The defenses of Gona, 1942, the western end of the 3.5 mile-long Gona position in the Buna-Gona area. The areas within this position called the Triangle, Coconut Grove, and the Island were particularly difficult to overwhelm for US forces. The defenses also featured hundreds of foxholes, dugouts, and other small positions, which are not shown here. In the upper right are trench lines positioned perpendicular to the coast. These trenches faced Allied troops that had penetrated the outer defenses and were attempting to roll up the defenses from the flank. They proved particularly difficult to take (p.32)
Map 5. 18th Army’s attack plan on the Driniumor River, July 10-11, 1944. The frontal attack in the center of the American line east of Apitape strove to achieve a breakthrough; it was successful, and created a gap in the line. The 237th Infantry swung north and took up positions behind the US frontline; it remained there for several days, before being driven back. The 78th and 80th moved south to occupy the southern and of the line. US counterattacks were able to restore the line, and had driven the remnants of the 20th Division across the river by August 1 (p.33)
Map 6. Southeast Area command and control, November 1943 (p.44)
Map 7. The locations and dates of American landings and raids (black), and Japanese reinforcement landings (red), on Guadalcanal, 1942 (p.50)
Map 8. The Henderson Field attack, and the Battle of Edson’s Ridge, September 12-14, 1943 (p.54)
Map 9. Henderson Field offensive, October 23-26, 1943 (p.55)
Map 10. The Japanese line, December 1942 - January 1943 (p.59)
Map 11. New Georgia Group, June-October 1943 (p.66)
Map 12. Bougainville, November 1943 - March 1944. Concentrations of Japanese forces are depicted at the time of the November 1 American landing at Cape Torokina. The Japanese deployment routes for the March counteroffensive underline the transportation and logistical difficulties the Japanese faced (p.71)
Map 13. Japanese movements in Eastern New Guinea, July 1942 - April 1944. On this map, different colours have been used to distinguish the units, and refer only to Japanese forces (p.74)
Map 14. Buna-Gona positions, November 1943 - January 1944. In addition to the four main positions (Gona, Sanananda-Giruwa, South Giruwa, and Buna), there were countless small, scattered positions in between. It required seven Australian brigades, four US regiments, and over two month of brutal fighting to reduce Buna-Gona (p.75)
Map 15. The withdrawal from Buna-Gona, January 1943. Some elements of those units destroyed here managed to escape 20 miles west to the Kumusi River, or were evacuated by barge. The fact that some 3400 managed to escape was unknown to the Allies (p.78)
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(Bruce Quarrie. Osprey Publishing, 2005)
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Glossary (p.92-94)
Map 1. El Alamein, October 1942 (p.74)
Map 2. Primosole Bridge, 13-14 July (p.78)
Map 3. Primosole Bridge, 15-17 July (p.79)
Map 4. Mussolini’s rescue from Gran Sasso, September 1943 (p.82)
Map 5. Anzio, February 1944 (p.86)
Map 6. Cassino, March 1944 (p.87)
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(Tim Moreman. Osprey Publishing, 2006)
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Chronology (p.86-87)
Abbreviations (p.89)
Map 1. The locations of the main cross-Channel Commando raids, together with the relevant operation names and dates (p.7)
Map 2. The route taken to the Lofoten Islands from Scapa Flow during Operation Claymore (p.56)
Map 3. The landings of Nos. 3 and 4 Commandos in the Lofotens (p.57)
Map 4. The raid on Vaagso (p.60)
Map 5. The outward and homeward routes taken by the St. Nazaire raiding force (p.68)
Map 6. The objectives and progress of the Commando teams at St. Nazaire, 0130-0200 hours, 28 March (p.69)
Map 7. Operation Infatuate I and II, Walcheren, 1944. The inset map shows the location of the Scheldt estuary (p.73)
Map 8. The amphibious landings in South Arakan and central Burma, and the approach to Kangaw (p.80)
Map 9. The fighting around Hill 170, Arakan (p.81)
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(Pier Paolo Battistelli. Osprey Publishing, 2006)
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Abbreviations and glossary (p.93-94)
Map 1. Ras el Mdauuar, 30 April - 1st May 1941 (p.44)
Map 2. Two days of battle - Sidi Rezegh, 22-23 November 1941 (p.45)
Map 3. Belhamed, 1-2 December 1941 (p.48)
Map 4. Intelligence and deception - Benghazi, 29 January 1942 (p.48)
Map 5. Flachenmarsch at Gazala, 26 May 1942. The advance of Axis troops in the first stages of Operation Theseus had been carefully planned; 90.leichte Division was to cover the right flank of the DAK and advance to El Adem, along with Panzer Aufklarungs Abteilung 33, which was to fill the gap between 90.leichte and 15.Panzer Division. The main advance was in the centre, along DAK’s “middle line” of advance (Mittellinie). To its right was 15.Panzer Division. The Italian XXI Corpo d’Armata was to move close to the British defences in order to break gaps in the minefields (p.51)
Map 6. Flachenmarsch at Gazala, the march order of 21.Panzer Division (p.51)
Map 7. El Mreir, 21-22 June 1942 (p.54)
Map 8. 21.Panzer Division at Alam Halfa, 30 August - 1 September 1942 (p.55)
Map 9. 21.Panzer Division crossing the minefields, 30 August 1942 (p.58)
Map 10. 21.Panzer Division’s defence at Deirel Taffa, 30 August - 1 September 1942 (p.58)
Map 11. Defeat - 15.Panzer Division at El Alamein, 2 November 1942 (p.59)
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(Steven J. Zaloga. Osprey Publishing, 2006)
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Map 1. Tank support in amphibious landings: Operation Torch, November 8, 1942 (p.54)
Map 2. Dispersion for defeat: 1st Armored Division at Faid Pass, February 14, 1943 (p.63)
Map 3. Tank destroyers in the defense: El Guettar, March 23, 1943 (p.69)
Map 4. Armor in the defense: Anzio beachhead, February 16, 1944 (p.77)
Map 5. Battle route of the 1st Armored Division: from Rome to the Alps, June 1944 - May 1945 (p.83)
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(Andrea Molinari. Osprey Publishing, 2007)
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Chronology (p.90-91)
Abbreviations and glossary (p.93-94)
Map 1. The Western Desert (p.5)
Map 2. The LRDG in the Fezzan, 27 December 1940 - 9 February 1941 (p.51)
Map 3. The LRDG in the Fezzan, 27 December 1940 - 9 February 1941 (p.54)
Map 4. The LRDG in the Fezzan, 27 December 1940 - 9 February 1941 (p.55)
Map 5. The Free French at Kufra, February 1941 (p.58)
Map 6. Reconnaissance in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania (p.59)
Map 7. The first campaign in the Fezzan, February-March 1942 (p.62)
Map 8. The LRDG/SAS partnership, March-May 1942 (p.65)
Map 9. The big raids, September 1942 (p.68)
Map 10. The big raids, September 1942 (p.69)
Map 11. The raids in Egypt, July-August 1942 (p.72)
Map 12. [Description] Von Almaszy’s mission to Egypt (p.73)
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(John Sayen. Osprey Publishing, 2007)
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Map 1. The Normandy landings, June 6, 1944 (p.55)
Map 2. The infantry assaults on Omaha Beach, June 6, 1944 (p.58)
Map 3. The US 28th Infantry Division sector in the Battle of the Bulge (p.62)
Map 4. Japanese positions on Luzon, January 11, 1945 (p.70)
Map 5. The capture of San Jose, Luzon, the Philippines, February 1-8, 1945 (p.71)
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(Steven J. Zaloga. Osprey Publishing, 2007)
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Glossary (p.94)
Map 1. Operation Neptune: routes of troop carrier missions (p.60)
Map 2. Operation Neptune: D-Day airborne landings, June 6, 1944 (p.65)
Map 3. Operation Market: 101st Airborne Division landings, September 17, 1944 (p.72)
Map 4. Operation Market: 82nd Airborne Division landings, September 11, 1944 (p.73)
Map 5. Operation Varsity: 17th Airborne Division landings, March 24, 1945 (p.80)
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(Gordon L. Rottman. Osprey Publishing, 2007)
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Chronology (p.92)
Abbreviations and glossary (p.94)
Map 1. The Southwest Pacific. US airborne operations are indicated together with amphibious landings conducted by airborne units (p.5)
Map 2. The Choiseul diversion, 2d Parachute Battalion, October 28 - November 4, 1943 (p.50)
Map 3. Nadzab, New Guinea, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, September 5, 1943 (p.58)
Map 4. The parachute landings around Nadzab (New Guinea) (p.58)
Map 5. Noemfoor Island, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, July-August, 1944 (p.62)
Map 6. 11th Airborne Division relieves 7th Infantry Division, Leyte, November 28, 1944 (p.66)
Map 7. Japanese attacks on Burauen Airfields (Leyte), December 6-11, 1944 (p.67)
Map 8. Purple Heart Hill, December 26-27, 1944. 11th Airborne Division’s last battle on Leyte (p.67)
Map 9. 11th Airborne Division on Luzon, January 31 - February 4, 1945 (p.70)
Map 10. 11th Airborne Division, cracking the Genko Line (Luzon), February 4-21, 1945 (p.71)
Map 11. 503d Parachute Regimental Combat Team on Corregidor, February 16, 1945 (p.74)
Map 12. The Los Banos Internment Camp operation (Luzon), February 23, 1945 (p.81)
Map 13. Internment Camp No.2, Los Banos, Luzon, February 23, 1945 (p.84)
Map 14. The reduction of Mt Macolod during the clearing of southern Luzon, 187th GIR, March 23 - April 20, 1945 - a good example of airborne troops conducting assaults against heavily defended enemy positions (p.85)
Map 15. Camaliniugan, Luzon, Gypsy Task Force, June 23, 1945 - the last combat jump in World War II (p.88)
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(Tim Moreman. Osprey Publishing, 2007)
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Chronology (p.91-92)
Abbreviations (p.94)
Map 1. The Mediterranean theatre of war (p.5)
Map 2. The North African littoral - Tripolitania to Egypt (p.8)
Map 3. Operation Crusader - the opening moves (p.62)
Map 4. Operation Crusader - the Germans strike back (p.63)
Map 5. Operation Crusader - the dash to the wire (p.65)
Map 6. The Battle of Gazala - Rommel’s offensive (p.69)
Map 7. The Battle of Alam el Halfa (p.77)
Map 8. The Battle of the Mareth Line, 20-22 March 1943, showing the attack on the main defences (p.81)
Map 9. The Battle of Wadi Akarit (p.85)
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(Pier Battistelli. Osprey Publishing, 2007)
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Note: In the maps in this volume, the units and movements of national forces are depicted in the following colours: German army - Grey, Waffen-SS - Black, Luftwaffe - Sky blue, French - Dark Blue, British - Brown, Polish - Red, Belgian - Yellow.
Abbreviations and glossary (p.91-92)
Map 1. 4.Panzer Division at the Bzura, Poland, 13-14 September 1939 (p.74)
Map 2. Hannut, Belgium - the first tank vs. tank battle of the war, 12-13 May 1940 (p.78)
Map 3. Breakthrough at Sedan, France, 13-14 May 1940 (p.79)
Map 4. The Panzers are checked at Gembloux, France, 15 May 1940 (p.82)
Map 5. Rommel’s breakthrough at the Meuse, 12-15 May 1940 (p.86)
Map 6. The counter-attack at Arras, France, 21 May 1940 (p.87)
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Maps are presented in the DjVu format.
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(David Horner. Osprey Publishing, 2002)
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Chronology (p.9-11)
Map 1. The expansion of Japan, 1920-1941 (p.18-19)
Map 2. The conquest of Malaya, December 1941 - February 1942 (p.31)
Map 3. Japan’s conquest, December 1941 - August 1942 (1. 7 December 1941, Japanese carrier-borne aircraft attack Pearl Harbor; 2. 8 December 1941, Japan invades Malaya; 15 February 1942, Singapore surrenders; 3. 8-25 December 1941, invasion of Hong Kong; 4. 10 December 1941,Japanese invade Philippines; surrendered 6 May 1942; 5. 24 December 1941, Wake Island captured by Japanese; 6. 11 January 1942 - 8 March 1942, invasion of Dutch East Indies; 7. 19 January - 15 May 1942, invasion of Burma; 8. 23 January - 6 August 1942, invasion of New Britain, Solomons, New Guinea, and part of Papua; 9. 19 February 1942, Japanese carrier-borne and land-based aircraft attack Darwin; 10. 5 April 1942, Japanese carrier-borne aircraft attack Colombo; 11. 4-8 May 1942, Battle of the Coral Sea; 12. 31 May - 1 June 1942, Japanese submarines attack Sydney Harbour; 13. 3-6 June 1942, Battle of Midway; 14. 6-7June 1942, Japanese land in Aleutian Islands) (p.34-35)
Map 4. Allied operations in New Guinea and the Solomons, August 1942 - April 1944 (Land operations: 1. 7 August 1942, Americans land at Guadalcanal; Japanese withdraw on 7 February 1943; 2. 25 August - 6 September 1942, Japanese landing at Milne Bay is defeated by Australians; 3. 26 August - 2 November 1942, Japanese advance over the Kokoda Trail to within 97 miles (60 km) of Port Moresby and are then driven back to Kokoda by the Australians; 4. 16 November 1942 - 22 January 1943, US and Australian troops defeat Japanese at Buna Gona, and Sanananda; 5. 28 January - 11 September 1943, Japanese attack Wau and are driven back to Salamaua by the Australians; 6. 30 June 1943, Americans land on New Georgia; 7. 30 June 1943, Americans land at Nassau Bay; 8. 15 August 1943, Americans land on Vella Lavella; 9. 4 September 1943, Australians land at Lae; 10. 5 September 1943, Australians land at Nadzab and later advance up Markham Valley; 11. 22 September 1943, Australians land at Finschhafen; 12. 1 November 1943, Americans land on Bougainville; 13. 15 and 26 December 1943, Americans land on New Britain; 14. 15 February 1944, New Zealanders land at Green Island; 15. 2 January 1944, Americans land at Saidor; 16. 29 February 1944, Americans land on Los Negros; 17. 20 March 1944, Americans land at Emirau; 18. 22 April 1944, Americans land at Hollandia and Aitape; 19. 24 April 1944, Australians enter Madang. Naval battles: A. Savo Island, 9 August 1942; Cape Esperance, 11 October 1942; Guadalcanal, 12-15 November 1942; Tassafronga, 30 November 1942; B. Eastern Solomons, 24 August 1942; C. Santa Cruz Island, 26 October 1942; D. Bismarck Sea, 2-4 March 1943; E. Kula Gulf, 5-6 July 1943; F. Kolombangara, 12-13 July 1943; G. Vella Gulf, 6-7 August 1943; H. Vella Lavella, 6-7 October 1943; I. Empress Augusta Bay, 2 November 1943) (p.43)
Map 5. The Allied counteroffensive, August 1942 - September 1944 (1. 7 August 1942, US forces land at Guadalcanal; 2. September 1942, Australians defeat Japanese at Milne Bay and advance back over Kokoda Trail; 3. 30 June 1943, US forces land at New Georgia; 4. 30 June - December 1943, US and Australian forces land in New Guinea and New Britain; 5. May-August 1943, US and Canadian forces recover Aleutian Islands; 6. 20 November 1943, US forces invade Tarawa and Makin Islands; 7. 31 January - 17 February 1944, US forces land on Kwajalein and Eniwetok islands; 8. 15 March - 22 June 1944, Japanese invasion of northeastern India defeated; 9. 22 April - 30 July 1944, US forces advance along New Guinea coast from Hollandia to Sansapor; 10. April 1944, Japanese begin Ichigo offensive in China; 11.15 June 1944, US forces land at Saipan; 12. 21 July 1944, US forces land at Guam; 13. 15 September, US forces land in Palau Islands and at Morotai) (p.50-51)
Map 6. The Allied invasion of Burma, 1944-1945 (1. Burma-Thailand railroad built by slave labor between July 1942 and October 1943 to resupply Japanese forces in India; 2. The Hump' - the route flown by US aircraft resupplying China; 3. February-March 1944. British 15th Corps advances into Arakan; Japanese counterattack results in battle of Admin Box. British resume offensive in December 1944; 4. 15 March 1944, Japanese invade north-eastern India. Kohima is relieved on 18 April and Imphal on 22 June; 5. March 1944, Northern Combat Area Command advances from Ledo and secures Myitkyina airfield by 17 May; 6. December 1944, Fourteenth Army invades Burma; 7. 1 May 1945, paratroops land at Rangoon and seaborne invasion takes place next day) (p.54)
Map 7. Philippines operations, 20 October 1944 - July 1945 (Landings and land operations: 1. 20 October 1944, US Sixth Army (Krueger), with four divisions, lands at Leyte. Three more divisions are deployed before the island is secured in December; 2. 9 January 1945, US Sixth Army, with four divisions, lands at Lingayen Gulf. Six more divisions are landed during the battle for Luzon. The main fighting ceases in June, although pockets of Japanese remain; 3. 4 February - 3 March 1945, Battle for Manila; 4. February-July 1945, US Eighth Army (Eichelberger), with five divisions, conducts operations in the southern Philippines. They conduct over 50 landings 14 of which are medium to large operations; Battle of Leyte Gulf: A. 23 October 1944, US submarines sink two Japanese cruisers and damage one; B. 24 October 1944, Japanese Southern Force 1 (Nishimura) enters Surigao Strait and is engaged by US Seventh Fleet (Kinkaid). Only one Japanese ship survives; C. 24 October 1944, Japanese Southern Force 2 (Shima) withdraws without entering Surigao Strait; D. 24 October 1944, the carrier USS Princeton sunk by Japanese land-based aircraft; E. 24 October 1944, US air strikes sink Japanese battleship and damage a cruiser; F. 25 October 1944, Japanese Centre Force (Kurita) retreats back through San Bernadino Strait after losing two cruisers. The US lost two escort carriers, two destroyers, and a destroyer escort; G. 25 October 1944, Halsey’s Third Fleet engages Northern (Decoy) Force (Ozawa) before withdrawing to meet the southern threats) (p.58)
Map 8. The Allied counteroffensive, 16 September 1944 - 22 August 1945 (p.62)
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(Geoffrey Jukes. Osprey Publishing, 2002)
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Chronology (p.9-14)
Map 1. The rival invasion plans (a) produced by an Army High Command (OKH) team under General Marcks in early August 1940, aimed the main thrusts at Moscow and Kiev (p.18)
Map 2. The rival invasion plans (b) adopted by Colonel-General Halder, Chief of General Staff of OKH, on 5 December 1940. This added a strong thrust at Leningrad to Marcks’ plan (p.18)
Map 3. The rival invasion plans (c) laid down by Hitler in Directive No. 21 (Operation Barbarossa) of 18 December 1940. This version of the plan made the destruction of Soviet forces in the Baltic States and the taking of Leningrad first priority. Moscow was to be considered only after this had been achieved (p.19)
Map 4. The front line at the start of Operation Typhoon (p.31)
Map 5. The Soviet counteroffensive at Moscow (p.35)
Map 6. The Red Army springs the trap at Stalingrad (p.43)
Map 7. The German plan for Operation Citadel. The intention was to eliminate the salient by the classic method, driving across its neck from north and south. However, the Soviets expected this (p.50)
Map 8. Partisan areas, 1943-1944 (The open steppes of the Ukraine offered little scope for large-scale partisan activity, and most groups there were small. In Belorussia and the Baltics, forests and swamps made it easier for partisans to form large bands and even to take control of sizable areas. They contributed notably to the Soviet successes at Kursk in 1943 and in Belorussia in 1944 by disrupting German communications and monitoring German troop movements. Some partisans in Ukraine and the Baltics were nationalist and fought Soviet as well as German rule. In February 1944 Ukrainian nationalist partisans ambushed and mortally wounded front commander General Vatutin. These anti-Soviet formations fought on until 1947) (p.54)
Map 9. Soviet gains, November 1943 - August 1944 (In this period the battle for the Dnepr (August-December 1943) was followed by the lifting of the siege of Leningrad (January 1944), and by Operation Bagration in Belorussia (June-August 1944), with associated offensives on the Finnish, Carpathian, and southern sectors. By the end of August, the Germans had been expelled from almost all Soviet territory, and the Red Army had entered Romania, Poland, and East Prussia) (p.62)
Map 10. From the Vistula to the Oder, January 1945 (This Soviet offensive lasted only 22 days (12 January - 2 February 1945), but ended with a seizure of bridgeheads across the Oder only about 60 miles (100km) from Berlin) (p.66)
Map 11. The Battle of Berlin, April 1945 (p.70)
Map 12. The campaign in the Far East, August 1945 (This campaign was noteworthy for the logistical problems of supplying a highly mechanized force, 1.7 million strong, over enormous distances. The actual fighting lasted only two weeks. For the Soviet Union's brief participation, Stalin took more Japanese territory (Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands) than his allies, who had fought Japan for several years) (p.79)
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(P. Grove, M. Grove, A. Finlan. Osprey Publishing 2002)
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Chronology (p.9-12)
Map 1. Europe steers toward war (p.14)
Map 2. The Mediterranean (p.39)
Map 3. Red Sea. Mussolini's decision to declare war on a statistically weaker Britain in the Mediterranean may have seemed a worthwhile gamble. However, it meant that the Red Sea forces were cut off from Italy and their supplies. Unless Italy could defeat British forces in Egypt and east Africa, its isolated naval garrison would eventually succumb to an overwhelming Royal Navy presence. Initially, Italy held the advantage over the British Empire on the land in east Africa, forcing an amphibious withdrawal. However, the same naval flexibility enabled British forces to come back into east Africa and ensured eventual victory in 1941 and the seizure of the Italian ports (p.42)
Map 4. Japanese incursions in the Indian Ocean (p.47)
Map 5. Eastern Indian Ocean - sinkings and incursions. The Imperial Japanese navy made only one large-scale sortie into the Indian Ocean during the Pacific War, and that was during April 1942 The Japanese feet accounted for a number of vessels and forced Admiral Somerville's fleet to the western Indian Ocean. However the Japanese failed to take advantage of their naval superiority. Following strikes against Ceylon and targets in the Bay of Bengal, they withdrew to the Pacific (p.50)
Map 6. Arctic convoy routes, winter and summer. From August 1941 the Royal Navy started running vital resupply convoys around northern Norway to the beleaguered Soviet Union. Eventually, almost 4.5 million tons of war materiel would be carried by this route. But constrained by both geography and the atrocious Arctic weather and, after March 1942, subjected to the concentrated efforts of German aircraft, submarines, and surface vessels lurking in Norwegian fjords, this was the most dangerous of all convoy routes, with almost 8.5 percent of merchant vessels despatched lost (p.54)
Map 7. Madagascar. Operation Ironclad was a testing ground for British amphibious operations following their initial failures earlier in the war One area that was exploited far better than in previous landings was the use of carrier-based aircraft, particularly in larger numbers. The carriers HMS Illustrious and HMS Indomitable flew a cross section of the British naval aircraft of the time, employing Swordfish, Albacores, Fulmars, Martletts (Wildcats), and Sea Hurricanes. The Illustrious was also used in the successful operations in September (p.55)
Map 8. The Atlantic. The key to the naval war was control of the Atlantic. Forays of large German surface units such as Bismarcks could be dealt with. However, continuing the menace of German submarine Wolf Packs that preyed on Allied convoy routes, which grew in complexity as the war progressed, was a much greater problem. It was not until the late spring of 1943 that adequate control of the Atlantic had been acquired with the increasing availability of very long-ranged land based maritime patrol aircraft playing a vital role (p.58)
Map 9. Normandy landings. D-Day saw US and British airborne landings on either flank of the assault areas to protect the Allied seaborne landings. Forces arrived in Area Z from the southern half of Great Britain - follow up forces would come from the whole country - and several thousand vessels of all kinds were funnelled through narrow channels swept through the deep-water minefields. By the end of 6 June 57,500 American and 75,215 British and Canadian troops would be ashore (p.66)
Map 10. D-Day gun duels. In an attempt to protect the coast German forces had created an Atlantic Wall of mines, obstacles and gun emplacements. Whilst not as formidably defended as some sections of the coast, the German heavy gun batteries in Normandy were sited to cover the entire landing area with interlocking arcs of fire and unmolested would have made the landings impossible. An essential feature that made the Allied landings possible, was the presence of large numbers of heavy naval vessels to counter the threat posed by these guns (p.67)
Map 11. The most intense areas of fighting (p.78)
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(Russell Hart & Stephen Hart. Osprey Publishing, 2002)
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Chronology (p.9-10)
Map 1. Strategic situation in Europe, 6 June 1944 (p.15)
Map 2. German dispositions in the west, 6 June 1944 (p.19)
Map 3. D-Day, 6 June 1944 (p.30)
Map 4. The Normandy campaign, 6 June - 20 August 1944 (p.35)
Map 5. Operation Market-Garden, 17-26 September 1944 (p.42)
Map 6. The Battle of the Bulge, 16-25 December 1944 (p.50)
Map 7. Allied advance in 1945 (p.54)
Map 8. The division of Germany and the emergence of the Cold War in Europe, 1945-57 (p.87)
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(Robin Havers. Osprey Publishing, 2002)
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Chronology (p.11-12)
Map 1. Germany and Central Europe after the Treaty of Versailles (p.18)
Map 2. Prelude to war: the Sudetenland, the Polish Corridor and Gleiwitz (p.34)
Map 3. The Poland campaign, September-October 1939 (p.42)
Map 4. The Norway campaign, April-May 1940 (p.47)
Map 5. The original German plan for the invasion of France and the revised version (p.50)
Map 6. The Battle of France: opening moves (p.54)
Map 7. The Battle of France: the race to the sea (p.58)
Map 8. The Battle of France: the Panzer breakthrough (p.59)
Map 9. The principal RAF and Luftwaffe bases (p.63)
Map 10. The strategic bombing campaign (p.67)
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(Paul Collier. Osprey Publishing, 2003)
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Chronology (p.10-11)
Map 1. The Mediterranean theater (p.7)
Map 2. Italy (p.18)
Map 3. Sicily (p.22)
Map 4. Ethiopia (p.34)
Map 5. Greece (p.35)
Map 6. Mediterranean (p.42)
Map 7. Tunisia (p.46)
Map 8. Torch (p.54)
Map 9. Compass and Rommel (p.87)
Map 10. Crusader (p.90)
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Maps are presented in the DjVu format.
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(Gordon L. Rottman. Osprey Publishing, 2003)
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Glossary, abbreviations (p.2)
Map 1. The Pacific Theater at the extent of the Japanese conquest and the subsequent establishment of the National Defense Zone (p.6)
Map 2. A hill strongpoint. This is an approximation of the internal defenses of Hill 130, what the Americans called the “Chocolate Drop”, 1500 yards northeast of Shrui, Okinawa. It is typical of multi-level hill strongpoints with an all-round defense. The US 77th Infantry Division, approaching from the north, took from May 11-17 to capture it, losing ten tanks and so many infantry that a regiment was reduced to a battalion. There are four levels, connected together by inclined passages: each level is indicated here by the number before a particular feature on that level (p.10)
Map 3. A dense trench system prepared for water’s-edge beach defense on Kwajalein Atoll, January 1944. Individual rifle and LMG pits are connected by unrevetted 2- to 2.5ft-wide, 3ft-deep trenches. Small coconut log bunkers were provided for each section for protection from naval bombardment (p.13)
Map 4. Inland defenses were situated to provide an all-round defense. This section position comprises one-man foxholes, individual dugouts, an LMG pillbox and a log sleeping shelter all connected by shallow, narrow communication trenches (p.16)
Map 5. Defense of Shemya Island in the Aleutian Islands of Alaska, defended by the 303d IIB, August 1942. The island measures 2.25 by 4.25 miles (the drawing is adapted from a captured Japanese sketch) (p.16)
Map 6. The Japanese defenses on the Pinnacle (Hill 145) (p.18)
Map 7. 14th IIB, 63d Brigade, 62d Division dispositions for a defense against an amphibious landing on the lower west coast of Okinawa north of Naha, March 1945 (p.46-47)
Map 8. Tactical examples. Japanese plan for the defense of a hypothetical coral atoll island reproduced in a 1944 issue of Tactical and Technical Trends. Note the Japanese expected the landing to occur on the ocean side of the island rather than from the atoll’s inner lagoon side (p.51)
Map 9. Tactical examples. Doctrinally specified Japanese platoon, company, and battalion defensive areas (p.52)
Map 10. Tactical examples. US tactics for assault on a Japanese pillbox (p.54)
Map 11. A Marine sketch of the Cape Torokina defenses on Bougainville, November 1943 (p.55)
Map 12. Japanese defenses of San Manuel village on Luzon. While US forces attacked from the south were the main defense line was established, an all-around defense was provided for. Many positions within the village were also oriented to the flanks and rear. It was defended by an infantry battalion and a tank brigade with some 40 medium and five light tanks. They were backed by six 105mm howitzers, seven 75mm regimental guns, and two 47mm AT guns along with many machine guns. The Japanese attention to providing depth to the defense is readily apparent. Only key buildings are shown (p.56)
Map 13. Because of the Marine raid on Butaritari Island, the occupied Gilbert Islands were heavily reinforced and upgraded defenses prepared there and on Tarawa. This diagram depicts the island’s defenses when the Army landed in November 1943 (p.61)
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(T. McGovern & M. Berhow. Osprey Publishing, 2003)
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Map 1. Manila and Subic bays, the Philippines (p.6)
Map 2. The layout of Battery Cheney (p.10)
Map 3. The mine defenses in Manila Bay, December 1941. The Army’s controlled minefields in the South Channel had been removed by this date and replaced with the Navy’s contact mines (p.11)
Map 4. Fort Drum, El Fraile Island, in the late 1920s (p.14-15)
Map 5. The Malinta Hill tunnel system (p.25)
Map 6. A horizontal fire control diagram for the American coast artillery. The target was located by the method of intersection used in surveying: the direction of the target was determined from two known points. The system required a base line on the ground, the azimuth and length of which had been accurately determined by surveying; two observation stations, one at each end of the base line, in each of which was mounted an instrument for measuring azimuths; a plotting room with plotting board; and the necessary communication lines. In the resultant triangle, one side and the two adjacent angles were known: the result was drawn graphically on the plotting board (p.27)
Map 7. The military situation in the Pacific Ocean, December 1941 (p.30)
Map 8. Japanese assault on Corregidor, May 5-6, 1942 (p.34)
Map 9. Corregidor Island (Fort Mills) and Caballo Island (Fort Hughes) in the late 1930s (p.35)
Map 10. The gun crew of Battery Geary operating the 12in. mortars under fire on May 2, 1942. At 1030 a Japanese 240mm howitzer projectile penetrated the reinforced concrete of the central magazine and detonated the ammunition stored there. The resulting explosion obliterated the magazine and destroyed all eight mortars (p.38)
Map 11. American landing and attack on Corregidor, February 16 to March 1, 1945 (p.39)
Map 12. Fort Frank, Carabao Island. The high narrow ridges of Carabao Island were transformed by engineers to hold two 14in. rifles on disappearing carriages, eight 12in. mortars, and two 3in. guns. The batteries were connected by a series of tunnels with underground railways (shown here in green), above-ground tracks (red), and pathways. The island had its own power generation plant and a desalination plant. Its proximity to the Cavite shore made it a frequent target for Japanese artillery during the 1942 campaign, but the garrison maintained and manned its weapons up until the day of surrender (p.47)
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(G. Williford & T. McGovern. Osprey Publishing, 2003)
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Chronology (p.6-8)
Map 1. Located in the east-central Pacific Ocean, the Hawaiian Islands are strategically and physically isolated. This map shows the relative distances in miles from Oahu to major Pacific Rim ports and locations (p.5)
Map 2. Oahu’s natural form derives from the rims of two ancient volcanoes, the remains of which are the extensive mountain ranges in the west (Waianae) and east (Koolau), with a flat central plain in between them. Only on the south shore do natural harbors exist, at Pearl Harbor and Honolulu (p.10)
Map 3. Leahi Peak fire control complex on Diamond Head. Leahi, the most southern peak on the rim of Diamond Head Crater east of Honolulu, was part of the original Fort Ruger Army reservation. It was selected to be the site of a unique multilevel fire control position. The construction work was carried out in 1910, and the complex transferred to coastal artillery troops on January 20, 1911. Four separate station levels were built into the cliff face, each serving a different battery or command: Station 1 served the First Battle Command; Station 2 served the First Fire Command and Battery Harlow; Station 3 served the Second Fire Command and Battery Dudley; and Station 4 served Battery Randolph. The stations were equipped with observation azimuths, plotting boards, and Depression Position Finder (DPF) instruments. The stations were reached using an approach trail, steep staircases, and an unlined tunnel ramp. Cable winches were used to haul supplies up the steep inclines. A small officers’ dormitory was located at the foot of the stairs, whereas quarters for enlisted men were in a ravine off the trail further down the slope. The stations served through World War II, and are still accessible today (p.19)
Map 4. The Oahu seacoast and land defense battery locations, together with the positions of the major defensive military reservations and their battery structures built between 1907 and 1925 (p.20)
Map 5. Fort Kamehameha on the southeastern side of the entry to Pearl Harbor as it might have appeared in 1921. Note the original, more developed western portion of the reservation, and how the defensive gun batteries are closely sited with the post, housing, and other buildings (p.27)
Map 6. Firing practice at Battery Harlow, Fort Ruger, mid. 1930s (p.31)
Map 7. Casemating Battery Hatch, Fort Barrette, 1942. The 16in. guns of Battery Hatch, Fort Barrette, were given massive overhead protection during 1941-42 using reinforced concrete, a process known as "casemating". Each structure contained a gun room (34ft x 51ft), two powder rooms (15ft x 73ft), two projectile rooms (12ft x 18ft), and a storeroom (10ft x 17ft). The concrete walls were 10-12ft thick. Above the magazines was 8ft of reinforced concrete, and this increased to 12ft over the gun itself. The structure was then capped with up to 24ft of earth, and a 1ft-thick concrete burster course (designed to detonate bombs or shells and absorb their explosion without harming the main structure). The trade-off for this increased protection was that the guns’ previous 360-degree field of fire was reduced to just 145 degrees. The illustration shows the No.2 gun casemate completed but as yet uncovered by earth, with work under way on the No.1 gun position: in reality, both were casemated simultaneously. Both guns kept their weapons in service throughout the work (p.42)
Map 8. Battery Arizona (p.46-47)
Map 9. The World War II fields of fire for the older retained and modernized batteries (over 8in.), the war emergency Navy turret batteries, and the new 8in. batteries on Oahu (p.51)
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(William Allcorn. Osprey Publishing, 2003)
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Chronology (p.5)
Map 1. The general distribution of all the fortifications built as part of the Maginot Line programme with the exception of those built in Corsica (p.7)
Map 2. The distribution of Maginot Line ouvrages and artillery in north-eastern France. Each vertical bar shows the artillery armament of the ouvrage located directly below it on the map. The only exception is that the 81mm mortars represented by the easternmost bar were mounted in an interval casemate (p.10)
Map 3. Gros Ouvrage of Fermont, Metz Fortified Region (p.14-15)
Map 4. Aumetz, Mauvais Bois, Hobling. Plans of three petits ouvrages in north-eastern France illustrating how various more or less standard blocks could be combined to meet local site requirements (p.18)
Map 5. Hackenberg, Rochonvillers, Schoenenbourg. Examples of gros ouvrages in north-eastern France. Hackenberg is generally accepted to be the largest ouvrage of all. Rochonvillers is unusual in a number of respects, not the least of which is that one of its machine gun turret blocks is located outside the combat block area. Schoenenbourg is the easternmost of the north-eastern gros ouvrages (p.26)
Map 6. The distribution of Maginot Line ouvrages and artillery in the Alps. Each vertical bar shows the artillery armament of the ouvrage located directly opposite it on the map (p.35)
Map 7. Saint Roch, Castillon, Pas du Roc, Monte Grosso. Examples of Alpine gros ouvrages. Castillon is a particularly compact ouvrage with a dual-level support area. Monte Grosso is one of only two ouvrages in the Alps with two turret blocks. In all cases, casemate-mounted artillery was mounted in pairs and individual pairs within a block generally fired in different directions. Except for two 75mm “mortars” in the gros ouvrage of Pas du Roc, all the 75mm weapons shown in the plans are 75mm guns (p.38)
Map 8. The Maginot Line in the Maritime Alps. Looking south-west along the line of Maginot Line fortifications near the town of Sospel in the Maritime Alps. L'Agaisen and Saint-Roch are middle-sized Alpine gros ouvrages. The garrison of L'Agaisen numbered about 300 officers and men while Saint-Roch had a garrison of just over 200. The ouvrages of L'Agaisen have been depicted uncovered to show their positions more clearly. Fort Barbonnet was built in the 1880s. Its primary armament consists of two turrets, also dating from the 1880s, each armed with two 155mm guns. The turrets were renovated in the 1930s and incorporated into the Maginot Line programme defences. The small Maginot Line gros ouvrage of Barbonnet was also built on the hilltop adjacent to the fort. The distance from the L'Agaisen to Fort Barbonnet is about 3km. The majority of the casemate-mounted artillery in this area fires generally north or south along the line of the ouvrages, but the 75mm gun and two of the 81mm mortars in block 4 of Saint-Roch fire to the east over Sospel. They defend the valley to the east of the town through which runs a road from Italy. This section of the Maginot Line was involved in the fighting against the Italians in 1940 with Fort Barbonnet's two turrets proving to be particularly effective (p.42)
Map 9. A plan showing the overlapping potential fields of fire of the close-in defences of the combat block area of the gros ouvrage of Michelsberg. The twin machine guns and anti-tank gun of the infantry casemate block at the right and the cloche-mounted twin machine gun at the bottom fire along the line of obstacles (not shown) connecting the works together. The plan does not reflect dead ground, but in general care was taken during construction to avoid dead ground to the maximum extent possible (p.46)
Map 10. The Arrancy subsector, Metz Fortified Region. The French Army dispositions are those in May 1940, just prior to the opening of the 1940 campaign. Units of the 51st Infantry Division supported the fortress troops assigned to the subsector. By the time the area came under sustained German attack in mid-June, the 51st Infantry Division and the mobile fortress troops had been withdrawn. This made it possible for German army units to move through the small gap in the Maginot Line to the west of Longuyon, between it and the start of the Montmedy Bridgehead, and to attack the fortifications of the Arrancy subsector from the rear (p.50)
Map 11. The 1940 campaign (p.51)
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(Neil Short. Osprey Publishing, 2004)
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See also Campaign 181: The Siegfried Line 1944-45 - Battles on the German frontier
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Chronology (p.8)
Map 1. Map of the West Wall showing the main defences, the Luftverteidigungszone (West), and the Neckar - Enz and Wetterau - Main - Tauber Stellungs (p.6)
Map 2. A Bird's Eye View of the Defensive System. By contrast with the Maginot Line, the defences of the Siegfried Line were built on the concept of defence in depth. The idea had been developed in the First World War and was now adopted for Hitler's impregnable West Wall. The attacker would be drawn further and further into the thick band of pillboxes. Their progress would be slowed or stopped completely allowing Germany time to mobilise her reserves and repel the invader. Bunkers that could mount both anti-tank weapons and machine guns and which could house a small detachment of soldiers were constructed all along Germany's western border. They were constructed in such a way that the fire from one shelter covered the approaches to another. At particularly weak points the defences were some miles deep. Where the terrain was suitable for the movement of tanks, anti-tank defences were constructed - usually the so-called dragon's teeth (p.23)
Map 3. The Gerstfeldhohe Tunnel System at Niedersimten. The Gerstfeldhohe tunnel system at Niedersimten, near Pirmasens, was planned to be a key defensive installation of the West Wall. A series of interconnected bunkers and pillboxes were to be constructed that would dominate the Trulben valley which was a natural avenue of attack from France. These positions in turn were to be linked by a 68m high elevator shaft to a further tunnel system that provided a safe haven for both the personnel and ammunition. A light railway was planned to run from the entrance at Niedersimten to the lift while another linked up the various fighting positions. By the time construction work was suspended following the defeat of France around three million Reichsmarks had been spent on the project. Work was restarted in 1944 but only on a very limited scale. Its main wartime contribution was to act as an air raid shelter for local residents and after the war served as a depot for US Army stores. Today the Gerstfeldhohe is home to the Westwall Museum. One thousand metres of tunnels are open to the public with write-ups and exhibits (p.42)
Map 4. The territory captured by the French in the so-called 'Saar Offensive' of September 1939. The French made no attempt to attack the West Wall (p.46)
Map 5. [Description] Tactical examples. A View of American Techniques for Assaulting Fortified Positions (p.50)
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(Charles Stephenson. Osprey Publishing, 2004)
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Map 1. The British 20th-century defences (p.46)
Map 2. Fort Campbell (p.47)
Map 3. Allied and Axis lines of communication. Following the acquisition of a North African empire in the early years of the 20th century, Italian north-south communications with Libya were potentially threatened by British possession of Malta. This potential was realised following the outbreak of hostilities between Italy and Britain in 1940. The opposite was also true as British and Allied communications with Malta were at peril due to Italian and Axis interdiction. Shown here are the salient elements of this two-way battle of attrition conducted on both sides by sea and air. The materiel advantage lay with the Allies, who could draw on neutral shipping and US industrial resources (p.51)
Map 4. Operation Herkules. The operation to capture Malta was supposed to commence with an airdrop, at reinforced battalion strength, securing the coastline between Wied iz-Zurrieq and Ghar Lapsi. This assault force was to be dispatched in gliders at dawn and approach the south coast of Malta from the west, with the aim of establishing a bridgehead and, if possible, capturing the airfield close by at Hal Far. Close air support would be provided by the 'flying artillery' of the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica. With the bridgehead secured, the second phase was to commence with the amphibious landing onto the beaches of elements of La Spezia and the panzer regiment. Simultaneously, the entire remaining parachute complement of the force was to drop in the area south of the twin cities of Mdina/Rabat, moving on to capture them as soon as possible. The third phase would begin with the force in the bridgehead striking eastwards with the object of either consolidating, or indeed capturing if this had not been achieved, Hal Far airfield and taking the smaller strip at Safi. The ultimate objective of this thrust was the harbour at Birzebuggar. In co-ordination with this manoeuvre, the paratroops were to spread out from the Mdina/Rabat area and move north-east towards Ta'Qali and south-east to Luqa airfield to prevent Allied use of the airfields. The reserve mountain division could be airlifted into Hal Far and Safi airfields, provided of course that they had been captured. Phase four was to start with the remaining elements of La Spezia landing at Birzebuggar and then all components were to advance on Valletta. La Spezia and the armour from the south, whilst the airborne troops were to strike from the west towards Sliema. The intention was for these forces to join up at Floriana and cut off Valletta. Once Valletta was taken the operation was considered to be over (p.55)
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(Bernard Lowry. Osprey Publishing, 2004)
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Chronology (p.61)
Map 1. One of several maps prepared by OKW for Operation Sealion showing the shorter landings front of September 1940 between Worthing and Folkestone. Shipping movements are shown from the French and Low Country ports. Note the blue paratrooper symbol to indicate airborne landings around Dover (p.7)
Map 2. The land and air defences of Britain, 1940-42. Each Army Command was empowered to work out their local system of defences, and it can be seen that there are variations in the grouping of the stop-lines. The lines would often follow river or canal systems. The primary purpose was to delay the movement of the enemy, especially his armoured formations, to gain time to muster reserves, and to protect London, major ports and the Midlands manufacturing area. Late in 1940, additional Army commands were created. During the Battle of Britain, RAF Fighter Command was split into four Groups, shown here, each of which was split into sectors. The principle early-warning Chain Home radar stations, so vital in the early part of the war, are also shown (p.14)
Map 3. Tactical examples. Defending an AT island (p.22-23)
Map 4. The 15in. No.1 gun 'Jane', Wanstone Battery, Kent. The 15in. naval gun 'Jane' (A) was one of two huge guns emplaced at Wanstone Farm (near St Margaret's-at-Cliffe, Kent) in spring 1942: the other was No.2 gun 'Clem', set c. 400m away. The combined firepower of these two weapons, together with the other locally-sited guns Winnie and Pooh, contributed to the cross-Channel duel with the German guns on Cap Gris Nez. The inset map (B) shows the ranges and locations of the guns: Clem and Jane could only dominate the Channel (max range 36,900 yds normal charge, 42,000 yds super charge) whereas Winne and Pooh's 14in. guns had a longer reach (47,250 yds). The guns were manned by the Royal Artillery 540th Coast Regiment. The No.l (C) and No.2 (D) ammunition magazines were protected with earthen covers. The gun had a dedicated power plant (E) next to it: the battery command post (not shown) lay further back. The guns were protected by four 3.7in. HAA guns (F): the command post for the HAA guns is at (G). Air raid shelters were also located in this area. Behind Jane's gun house lay an armoured crane, and a locker for live shells was to the left under a camouflage net supported by concrete pillars (H). The gun was fired from a platform on the right hand side of the gun house. A further inset (I) shows Jane in closer view (some of the camouflage has been removed for clarity). The Wanstone battery was eventually dismantled in 1957 (p.27)
Map 5. Coastal defences at Aldeburgh, Suffolk 1942. This illustration shows the layout of a typical 'Emergency Battery' position and defended beachhead in 1942. The battery comprises a pair of 6in. coast defence guns (No.1 Gun is at A, and No.2 Gun is at B), which cover the approaches to the beach. Considerable thought was given to the camouflage of coast artillery positions. Often a false roof would be built on top of the gun house and a canvas screen, painted to represent the front of a building, could be drawn across the front and secured with pegs, as shown in the inset image (K). To prevent the gun's shadow giving itself away, it would often be moved to lie parallel with the front of the gun house. The men of the battery were billeted in the hotel next to the No.2 Gun. The guns formed part of an integrated system of anti-invasion defences. Along the beach and behind the battery and observation post (F), tubular scaffolding has been erected to hinder both landings by boat and troop movements (C). Anti-tank cubes form the next level of protection (D), with concertina barbed wire laid behind them. Naval mines have also been buried in the beach (E). Two coast artillery searchlights illuminate the seaward approaches at night (No.l is at G, and No.2 is at H). The beach is also protected by a pillbox (I), and also by several Spigot Mortar positions close to the guns. An inset (J) shows the interior of the observation post for the battery, complete with a depression position finder, spotting binoculars and transmitting dial (p.30)
Map 6. 5.25in. HAA battery, London, 1943. This battery, located on Primrose Hill in North London, was one of only three twin-5.25in. HAA emplacements in Britain. These guns were diverted from Navy contracts and were obtained in an exchange for Bofors LAA guns. By the time they became operational in 1943, however, the threat from the Luftwaffe had greatly diminished. The 5.25in. gun (A) has a power plant next to it (B), and camouflage nets to disguise its concrete base (C). To the left of the main gun is a concrete holdfast (D) for a 3.7in. HAA gun, one of the earlier guns on the site, covered by a camouflage screen. In the battery Command Post (E), ATS personnel would operate the heightfinder (F), spotting binoculars (G), and the predictor (H). An inset (I) shows the layout of a 1941 -pattern HAA command post, different to the CP in the main illustration: key features include a Lewis gun (i), heightfinder (ii), predictor (iii), plotting room (iv) and emergency exits (v). A further inset (J) shows the location of the overall site, looking down on London (p.34)
Map 7. The Cabinet War Rooms, London. The fear of the mass-bombing of British cities lead in the late-1930s to the provision of bomb-proof accommodation for the members of British central government. In June 1938 work began on reinforcing the basement of the Office of Works building in Whitehall, London, the exterior of which is shown in the inset illustration. The building itself was a strong one and it was conveniently situated between the Houses of Parliament and 10 Downing Street, the home of the British Prime Minister. A 3ft-thick concrete and steel 'slab' (1) was installed over the basement of the building, together with a sub-layer of interlocking steel beams (2). The weight of this structure was supported by timber and brick props and pillars in the basement and sub-basement. At the heart of the underground complex lay the Cabinet Room (3): in May 1940 Churchill declared: 'This is the room from which I will direct the war'. During the course of the war over 100 meetings of the War Cabinet were held here. In addition to the main Cabinet Room, other areas contained secretarial offices, canteens, dormitories, Churchill's bedroom and a Map Room. Much of the facility is now open to the public (p.55)
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(Gordon L. Rottman. Osprey Publishing, 2004)
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Map 1. The German ‘elastic defence’ concept (p.6)
Map 2. Tactical examples. This squad battle trench (Kampfgraben) and approach trench (Annaherungsgraben) depicts the different positions incorporated into it: Schutzenloch fur 2 Schutzen (rifle position for 2 riflemen), Stichgraben (slit trench), Schutzennischen (fire steps), M.G.-Feuerstellung (machine-gun firing position), Unterstand (squad bunker), Schutzenausstieg (exit ladder or steps), Unterschlupf (dugout). Note that the feindwarts arrow points in the direction of the enemy (p.8)
Map 3. Tactical examples. A rifle platoon in defensive position, early war. An early-war rifle platoon (Zug) defensive position is depicted here with all three squads (Gruppe, labelled A, B and C) deployed on line. 19 two-man rifle positions (1) are used. It was intended that the squad light machine guns (2) be positioned to cover the entire platoon front without gaps, but this was not always possible. Alternate machine-gun positions may have been prepared to cover gaps as well as the flanks and the gaps between adjacent platoons. Time permitting, some scattered rifle and one or two light machine-gun positions may have been dug in the rear and oriented in that direction (3). On this type of terrain the positions were typically at 10m intervals, less in densely wooded terrain. In some exceptional circumstances one squad may have been deployed to the rear, oriented forward, to provide depth to the position. If the platoon had four squads one would normally be deployed in the rear. The platoon's 5cm light mortar (4) is positioned to the rear, but in a place where it could observe its target area, as it had no observers. A 3.7cm anti-armour gun (5) and two heavy machine-gun squads (6) have been attached to the platoon along with an anti-armour rifle troop (7). The forward perimeter and flanks are protected by a double-apron barbed wire fence (a 'Flanders fence', 8) some 30-50m from the positions, keeping the troops beyond hand-grenade range. Sods of earth for camouflaging the positions have been removed in the rear from beneath trees and brush (9). The Zugfurher's (10) and Zug-Truppfuhrer's (11) positions are also indicated. An observation or listening post (12) is located to the front of the platoon, beyond the wire fence. The large red arrow (feindwarts) indicates the direction towards the enemy (p.14)
Map 4. Tactical examples. A road junction strongpoint in Germany made conspicuous by the straight anti-armour ditches (A-D). The hedge-lined roads are blocked by anti-armour mines. Fighting trenches (E) are located in each quadrant of the road intersection. A 7.5cm infantry gun (F) is positioned in a hedgerow and a 2cm flak gun (G), also positioned to engage ground targets, is beside the intersection (p.15)
Map 5. Tactical examples. Defence of a village, north-west Europe. Villages were extremely irregular in pattern and layout, making the organisation of the defence, the selection of strongpoints, the positioning of crew-served weapons, and the placement of obstacles as difficult for the defender to determine as for the attacker to predict. There were endless possibilities. Light defences and observation posts were positioned on the village's outskirts. In this example, significant anti-armour defences are positioned on the outer edge to the left to blunt an expected tank penetration. These anti-armour guns would have alternate positions deeper in the village. Most strongpoints are located well within the village and machine gunners and snipers (in reality selected riflemen) are scattered through the village to disrupt and delay the attackers. Mortars and infantry guns are positioned to fire on all main approaches and they too have alternate positions in the event of the attacker approaching them. The strongpoints consist of interconnected defended groups of barricaded buildings with concealed firing positions, reinforced cellars and mouse holes connecting buildings. Two of the main roads through the village are left unblocked to allow attacking tanks to enter killing zones within the village. Anti-armour guns repositioned from the outer defence line to the left will cover these. The reserve platoon is located at A. Strongpoints are shown enclosed within red lines (p.18)
Map 6. Hedgerow defences, Normandy, 1944. The feint lines represent the hedgerows and the double broken lines are sunken roads. This c. 300m x 800m company area was self-contained and could fend off attacks from any direction. Note that the buildings were undefended, as they attracted artillery fire. If the perimeter were penetrated, troops would move to the flanking hedgerows to engage the attackers. There were several clusters of positions located in adjacent hedgerows on all sides of this area (p.19)
Map 7. 2cm flank gun position (p.38)
Map 8. Tactical examples. A squad strongpoint in the desert. Because of the need to defend wide frontages in the desert and the expansive fields of observation and fire, German units often built self-contained, widely scattered, reinforced squad strongpoints. An ideal example is shown here. The weapons positions and dugouts were to be at least 6m apart along the 40-60m zig-zag trench. One- and two-man rifle positions (1) were set 1-2m forward of the trench. Firing steps might be used, including on the trench's rear side. Not all such strongpoints had an 8cm mortar (2). A 2cm flak gun may have been substituted for the 3.7cm or 5cm anti-armour gun (3, shown above scale for clarity). Some strongpoints may have had two machine guns, one at each end (4 and 5). Lacking a flak gun, one of the machine guns (5) would be provided with an air-defence mount as well as an alternative position for ground fire. This combination of weapons provided the strongpoint with direct and indirect anti-personnel fire, direct anti-armour fire and air defence. Sufficient dugouts and small bunkers (6, hidden) were available for all personnel. Such a strongpoint might be manned by 16-24 troops. It would be sighted on any piece of high ground, even if only a couple of metres above the surrounding desert. Camouflage nets might have been used. The barbed-wire barrier (7), if present, was erected c. 50m from the strongpoint. Anti-armour mines would be emplaced outside the barbed wire along with some anti-personnel mines (8). The listening post (9), accessed via a crawl trench, was manned at night to guard against infiltration. Flare pistols were used to signal other strongpoints and command posts that a strongpoint was under attack, with coloured flare combinations identifying the type of attack and direction. The large red arrow (feindwarts) indicates the direction towards the enemy (p.46)
Map 9. [Key] Tactical examples. Infantry battalion defence sector. A full-strength infantry battalion normally deployed for defence with two companies forward on its 800-2,000m front. The positions of the heavy machine guns and mortars of the battalion machine-gun company (4th) are depicted along with the four 3.7cm anti-armour guns and two 7.5cm infantry guns attached from the regiment. Each platoon position (Zugspitze) contains three light machine guns and a 5cm mortar. Medical posts and ammunition points are located near each company command post. In this instance the 1st Company on the left has two platoons (1/1 and 2/1) deployed on the main battle line (Hauptkampflinie) with the 3rd Platoon (3/1) in outposts (Vorposten). It would withdraw to a reserve position behind 1/1 and 2/1 blocking the main road through the company sector. The 2nd Company on the right has its 3rd Platoon (3/2) also in an outpost position. It, however, would withdraw to a position on key terrain forward of 1/2 and 2/2. When forced to withdraw from that position it would occupy a reverse slope reserve position behind 1/2 and 2/2. The 3rd Company is positioned as the battalion reserve across the rear area. It can remain in position to block a breakthrough or conduct counter-attacks. The regimental boundary is shown by the 'III' line; the battalion boundary by the 'II' line; and the company boundary by the 'I' line. Contour lines for the terrain are also provided (p.51)
Map 10. Tactical examples. A company hilltop strongpoint. Stutzpunkt Zuckerhutl was typical of the company strongpoints in the far north of Finland in 1944. It was surrounded by two parallel double-apron barbed-wire fences with anti-personnel mines. A firing trench revetted with rock and mortar ran around the entire perimeter with communications trenches connected to support positions in the centre. The defenders were a 1st Mountain Infantry Regiment, 2nd Mountain Division rifle company reinforced with a pioneer platoon, crew-served weapons from the battalion, and artillery forward observers. They were armed with 13 light and 8 heavy machine guns, two 8cm mortars, two 3.7cm anti-armour guns and two 7.5cm infantry guns, the normal allocation of weapons from the battalion heavy companies and the regimental anti-armour company. Two-man firing positions and machine-gun bunkers lined the perimeter. The reason for the apparently irregular spacing of these positions is their siting to cover the approaches across broken terrain. Troops were quartered in various support bunkers and two-squad bunkers. Note that the command post is on the forward perimeter enabling the commander to directly observe the enemy. The large red arrow indicates the direction towards the enemy (feindwarts) (p.58)
Map 11. Westwall defences, Germany, October 1944. The 1,100m2 area shown lies immediately to the south of Palenberg. The moated Rimburg Castle, to the centre left, was heavily defended, as was the large farm complex to the upper right of the castle. The Wurm River flows through the upper left area - itself an obstacle with its bridges blown. The double railroad tracks were on an elevated embankment, which was incorporated into the defences to form an anti-armour obstacle. Where the embankment is low an anti-armour ditch was built (the heavy grey line in the lower left). The end of a second-line anti-armour ditch is visible in the lower right corner. Ten concrete bunkers within this square covered the railroad embankment and anti-armour ditch, and a further one is shown covering the second-line anti-armour ditch. Some six or so rifle, machine-gun and Panzerschreck positions were dug around these bunkers, with some of them connected by trenches (p.59)
Map 12. Tactical examples. The defences of a German town annotated by US aerial photo interpreters. Warehouses are located on the left edge above a railway yard. A row of houses stretches to the right of the warehouses and more dwellings can be seen in the lower right. The continuous, barbed-wire protected, first-line trench stretches across the photo's top with machine guns positioned in pairs. A position containing three 2cm Flak guns is in the upper right. Communications trenches run to the rear: these also served as flanking-fire trenches in the event of an Allied penetration of the first line. The second trench line covers the anti-tank ditch and it was from here that counter-attacks would be launched. The anti-tank ditch is linked to the row of houses and the warehouses, which probably have strongpoints located within some of the buildings. There were also probably mines and anti-armour obstacles blocking passages between buildings. Oddly, mortar positions are located forward of the second line (p.60)
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(Gordon L. Rottman. Osprey Publishing, 2004)
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Map 1. [Description] Tactical examples. A rifle platoon in defense (p.14)
Map 2. [Description] Tactical examples. An infantry battalion in defense (p.18)
Map 3. Defense of the Driniumor River, New Guinea, 1944 (p.51)
Map 4. The German attack on Ranger Advance Group at Pointe du Hoe, France, June 6/7, 1944 (p.58)
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(Simon Dunstan. Osprey Publishing 2005)
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Chronology (p.13)
Map 1. The Schlieffen Plan of 1914 was designed to envelop Paris from the north-east, but determined resistance from the Belgian, British and French armies disrupted the strategy and it faltered on the Marne and Yser Rivers resulting in four years of ghastly trench warfare. In 1940, the Germans lured the British and French mobile forces into Belgium. They then unleashed the 'Sichelschnitt' or 'sweep of the scythe' to split the Allied armies and precipitate the fall of France in just 42 days (p.7)
Map 2. The diagram shows the location of the various forts of the Position Fortifiee de Liege at the outbreak of World War II. The circles around the various major fortresses represent the ranges of their respective artillery weapons, with the 120mm guns of Fort Eben Emael reaching almost to the German border. The inner circle indicates the range of the 75mm guns, while the innermost one is of the 81mm mortars. The map also shows the various towns, villages and geographical features in the vicinity of Fort Eben Emael together with the major Belgian army formations in the area (p.11)
Map 3. Plan of Fort Eben Emael (p.14-15)
Map 4. Fields of fire (p.27)
Map 5. [Description] Flightpath, 10 May 1940 (p.42-43)
Map 6. Glider landings and objectives (p.50)
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(Steven J. Zaloga. Osprey Publishing, 2005)
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See also Fortress 63: The Atlantic Wall (1) - France
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Map 1. [Description] German coastal artillery batteries in range of the D-Day beaches (p.27)
Map 2. [Description] The Longues-sur-Mer naval coastal gun battery (p.36-37)
Map 3. Utah Beach defences (p.40)
Map 4. Omaha Beach defences (p.44)
Map 5. [Description] Strongpoint WN62 (p.48)
Map 6. Gold Beach defences (p.49)
Map 7. Juno Beach defences (p.53)
Map 8. Sword Beach defences (p.56)
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(Charles Stephenson. Osprey Publishing, 2006)
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Map 1. The general location of the Channel Islands in relation to the UK and France meant that any hostile power holding the French mainland, and equipped with a powerful air force, could dominate the Islands and interdict their lines of communication with the UK. Such was the situation in 1940 following the armistice between France and Nazi Germany (p.6)
Map 2. Battery Mirus, Le Frie Baton, north-west coast of Guernsey (p.14-15)
Map 3. Alderney: the main defences (p.18)
Map 4. Guernsey: the main defences (p.18)
Map 5. Jersey: the main defences (p.19)
Map 6. This diagram shows the range, and interlocking/overlapping effects of the fire, of the coastal artillery based on the Channel Islands. It can be readily seen that the northern entrance to the Gulf of St Malo was effectively interdicted by these weapons, as was much of the coastline along the Cotentin Peninsula (p.22)
Map 7. The defences at Vazon Bay, Guernsey, are, in a similar manner to all the coastal defences in the Channel Islands, somewhat reminiscent of the long-obsolete 'bastioned trace'. Bastions were constructed to project forward from the main line of defence with the object of subjecting an attacker to cross, or enfilade, fire. The works on the headlands, it can be seen, fulfilled exactly the same purpose, and any attacker attempting to land on the beach would have been subjected to an intense crossfire from a variety of weapons (p.26)
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(Neil Short. Osprey Publishing, 2006)
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Chronology (p.6)
German defensive lines in Italy (p.61)
Glossary (p.63)
Map 1. South Italy and Sicily (p.11)
Map 2. North Italy (p.15)
Map 3. Plan view of the Hitler Line (p.19)
Map 4. Plan view of a sector of the Gothic Line (p.22)
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(Gordon L. Rottman. Osprey Publishing, 2007)
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Map 1. Tactical examples. An anti-tank ditch. Anti-tank ditches provided an effective, although labour-intensive, means of halting or delaying enemy tanks. However, they also provided cover to attacking enemy infantry. Several methods were used to deny the enemy this cover. The ditches were dug close to the forward fighting positions, allowing heavy and accurate fire to be laid. Mortar fire was registered on the ditches. Barbed wire was placed in front of the ditches and sometimes behind them. Anti-personnel mines were sometimes placed inside or before ditches along with booby traps. Light machine-gun or rifle/submachine-gun positions were built into the ditches' sides at angles. To protect the blind-to-the-surface positions inside the ditch, rifle positions were placed forward of the main trench line. The ditches were also covered by interlocking machine-gun fire. Covered trenches sometimes linked the ditch positions and their forward covering positions to the main trenches (p.10)
Map 2. The construction of a section trench. A section trench system was built in five stages, over the course of 4-5 days. Stage 1: individual fighting positions were prepared approximately 3-4m apart with the two-man light machine-gun (LMG) position in the centre (marked with large rod arrows here). Stages 2 and 3: the fighting positions were improved and connected by a crawl trench, with each man working towards the LMG. Stage 3 saw the trench deepened, an exit trench prepared, and 'reserve firing positions' created to engage targets to the rear or flanks. Stage 4: the firing positions were further improved with covered embrasures, ammunition niches were dug, and reserve firing positions were prepared in the ends of the trench and along the communications trench. The latter ran to the rear to connect to trenches that linked the platoon's other sections. Stage 5: dugouts were prepared in the forward trench, trench sections were covered, drainage sumps were added, a 4-5m extension was added to the shelter trench and covered (note escape exit), and other refinements were made throughout. Some 30-50m to the rear (shown nearer here) a 4-5m-long slit trench was dug off the communications trench (p.42)
Map 3. Completed and improved section trench. The completely developed section trench system often included short trench extensions dug forward from the main trench. Ammunition niches would be dug into the sides of some of these. The section trench could be linked to other section trenches within the platoon via communications trenches in the rear, or the section's forward trenches could be linked end-to-end. If time and materials were available more trench sections would be covered or camouflage nets/mesh erected over all sections. Barbed-wire obstacles would be some 40m forward, outside of hand-grenade range. The lower left inset shows a covered firing embrasure. The centre right inset shows a section view of the LMG bunker (p.43)
Map 4. [Description] Tactical examples. A company strongpoint (p.52)
Map 5. Tactical examples. A defended building (p.56-57)
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(Steven J. Zaloga. Osprey Publishing, 2007)
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See also Fortress 37: D-Day Fortifications in Normandy
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Map 1. The Atlantic Wall in France, 1944 (p.10)
Map 2. [Description] Batterie Todt (p.18-19)
Map 3. The “Iron Coast”. German coastal defenses on the Pas-de-Calais in June 1944 (p.23)
Map 4. [Description] Strongpoint WN10, Les Dunes de Varreville (p.35)
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Maps are presented in the DjVu format.
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(Gregor Ferguson. Osprey Publishing, 1984)
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Map 1. Airborne operations in North Africa, 1942-43. North Africa, where the Parachute Regt. earned nine of its 28 World War II battle-honours. Tamera, the site of one of their hardest engagements, lies between Sedjenane and “Beggar’s Bump” (p.7)
Map 2. Sicily, July 1943. The scale is deceptive. The scatter of parachutists extended from the Primosole Bridge DZ as far as Adrano and Mt. Etna some 30 miles away (p.11)
Map 3. Normandy, 6 June 1944: DZs (drop zones) and LZs (landing zones) marked here are mainly notional - the drops were widely scattered, and only the coup de main party at “Pegasus Bridge” went in as planned (p.17)
Map 4. The battle of Arnhem. DZs and LZs of 1st Airborne Div.: it is easy, with hindsight, to see how much better off the division would have been if they had been dropped to the south and east of the two road bridges (immediately north of DZ “K” on this map) (p.24)
Map 5. Operation “Varsity” was a complete success, despite heavy casualties, and the arrival of part of the US 513th Parachute Infantry on the 12th Devon’s LZ. The crossings at Wesel and to the north-east of Xanten had already been secured by the time the drop was supposed to go in (p.32)
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(Ian Summer. Osprey Publishing, 2001)
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Map 1. The crossings of the Irrawaddy, 1945 (p.29)
Map 2. The capture of Meiktila, March 1945 (p.31)
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(Alfred Price. Osprey Publishing, 2004)
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Map 1. Fighter command’s riposte to the attack on London on the afternoon of 15 September 1940
Map 2. Disposition and re-disposition of defences to counter the V.1 flying bomb attack on London, 1944
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(Martin Brayley. Osprey Publishing, 2005)
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Map 1. Civil defence regions. Mainland Great Britain was divided into 12 Civil Defence Regions, with manpower and assets provided as required depending on the local industrial or military targets. London was the smallest region, allowing a concentration of assets in the heavily bombed capital; Scotland was the largest and least targeted, since it was threatened only by the four Luftwaffe twin-engined bomber Gruppen based in Scandinavia, which seldom ventured across the broad expanse of the North Sea, while 35 Gruppen were based in northern France and the Low Countries. The National Fire Service would be divided in a similar, although not geographically identical manner (p.6)
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(Gordon L. Rottman. Osprey Publishing, 2004)
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US Pacific Theater Amphibious Operations
Map 1. The Pacific and adjacent theaters of operations, April 1945 (p.4)
Map 2. Main island groups in the Pacific Theater of Operations (p.5)
Map 3. The formation employed by Task Force 62 en route to Guadalcanal, August 1942; the amphibious force is led and followed by cruisers, and surrounded by outer rings of destroyers (p.25)
Map 4. Naval gunfire areas of responsibility for the last day’s bombardment of Iwo Jima (D-1), designating sectors and specific ship target areas. OBB is the code for a 14in-gun battleship, CA for an 8in-gun heavy cruiser, and CL for a 6in-gun light cruiser (p.26)
Map 5. 542nd Engineer Boat & Shore Regt landing diagram for Yaleau Plantation, northwest of Saidor, New Guinea, in March 1944 provides the time each wave was to land, numbers and types of landing craft, and numbers of troops in each wave (p.27)
Map 6. Tactical examples. Battalion assault plan, 1944
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(G. Rottman & A. Takizawa. Osprey Publishing, 2005)
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Map 1. Southern operations area. Japanese parachute operations 1942 & 1944 (p.21)
Map 2. Yokosuka 3rd SNLF on West Timor, February 20-22, 1942. The Japanese planners had expected the Allied troops to stand and fight for the southern beach positions, Koepang and the airfield, as Japanese soldiers would have done. They had not anticipated that the defenders, once outflanked by the amphibious landings, would withdraw and maneuver to meet the advancing paratroopers. At Manado paratroopers had jumped directly on to the airfield, resulting in excessive casualties. At Koepang, in an effort to avoid a repeat, they jumped too far from the objective, and the unexpected Allied reaction and dense jungle prevented them from accomplishing their mission (p.26)
Map 3. 2nd Raiding Regt at Palembang, February 14-15, 1942 (p.30)
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(Gordon L. Rottman. Osprey Publishing, 2006)
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Map 1. C company, British 2nd parachute battalion at Bruneval, 28 February 1942
Map 2. German airborne invasion of Crete, May 1941
Map 3. Soviet Desant at Medyn, January 1942
Map 4. US 82nd & 101st airborne divisions, Normandy, June 1944
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(P. Jowett & B. Snodgrass. Osprey Publishing, 2006)
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Chronology (p.5-17)
Map 1. Finland in 1939-45 (p.4)
Map 2. The major Mannerheim Line defences across the Karelian Isthmus. VT Line = Vammelsuu-Taipale, VKT Line = Viipuri-Kuparsaari-Taipale. The Main Line was that built from the 1920s, and defended in December 1939; the others were built during 1941-44. The VT Line was still incomplete when it was hit by the Soviet offensive of June 1944 (p.13)
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(Gordon L. Rottman. Osprey Publishing, 2006)
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US Amphibious Operations in the Mediterranean & European Theaters (EMTO)
Map 1. Major amphibious operations in the EMTO, 1942-44 (p.6)
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(Dr. Stephen Bull. Osprey Publishing, 2007)
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Map 1. Tactical examples. Japanese tactics for a battalion night attack (up the page), when the objectives were usually less ambitious than during daylight, although the attack would be preceded by a period of infiltration to neutralize the enemy response. Two companies are tasked with seizing the first objective, the fresh third and fourth companies passing through them. Individual platoons within the companies remain in loose columns unless resistance dictates otherwise, and one platoon is kept back as reserve. (From the US Handbook on Japanese Military Forces) (p.9)
Map 2. A Japanese plan showing a variation on the 'scorpion manoeuvre' as used at the battle of Kampar, Malaya, 30 December 1941 - 2 January 1942. The advance is in two main columns, one of which engages the 15th Indian Bde frontally, while the 42nd 'Ando' Regt follows the course of the railway through the jungle to emerge in the Allied rear (p.13)
Map 3. Tactical examples. The Japanese use of flanking columns at infantry division level, as depicted in the US Handbook on Japanese Military Forces. The 'left' and 'right' detachments might be several miles either side of the main body, and might advance a similar distance beyond (p.14)
Map 4. Tactical examples. Formation for a British platoon moving through jungle, from Forest, Bush, and Jungle Warfare..., August 1942. 'The platoon sergeant maintains direction through his leading section, and keeps station through the rear section.' (p.21)
Map 5. Tactical examples. British battalion defence, from Forest, Bush, and Jungle Warfare Against a Modern Enemy, published in August 1942. The deployment is as a series of platoon positions across the front, covering the jungle as well as the road. Small mobile reserves are kept to counter-attack infiltration or outflank the enemy (p.22)
Map 6. Tactical examples. A scheme for a British infantry brigade defence, as outlined in Forest, Bush, and Jungle Warfare..., August 1942. It shows the company locations of the forward left-hand battalion fending off a Japanese secondary probe, while the main enemy effort hits the forward right-hand battalion with the usual two-prong enveloping attack. The lessons of six months beforehand have already been learnt: the two forward battalions hold their ground, while the reserve battalion deploys with artillery support to meet the 'scorpion's tail' (p.23)
Map 7. Tactical examples. 'Automatic defence': a diagram showing how an Australian platoon was supposed to react on coming under attack, if it had no other orders. Each section has a scout well forward on a flank; the section leaders are in close touch with their LMG groups, and the rest of the section personnel are spread out behind in support. The diameter of the whole position was not to exceed 150 yards. (Australian 6th Division instructions, 1943) (p.26)
Map 8. Tactical examples. 'Automatic defence' schemes for an Australian company. The whole position could be up to 300 yards across, allowing platoons to be up to 100 yards apart, and sections up to 50 yards. The left-hand scheme gives each platoon its own reserve section; the right-hand scheme gives the company commander a whole platoon in reserve. (Australian 6th Division instructions, 1943) (p.26)
Map 9. Tactical examples. Japanese combined arms 'Special tactics', 1941-42 (B)
Map 10. Tactical examples. Japanese night attack, 1943 (C)
Map 11. Tactical examples. Australian section tactics, 1943 (D)
Map 12. Tactical examples. Australian section defensive positions, 1943 (E)
Map 13. Tactical examples. British 'Advance on a broad front'; Burma, 1944-45 (G1)
Map 14. Tactical examples. Ambush techniques (H)
Map 15. Plan of the Japanese defences at Buna, New Guinea, as depicted in the US Handbook... in October 1944. Open areas are covered by fire, but many of the bunkers and trenches are sited in woodland and jungle, and grouped for mutual support. The density of the bunker system at Cape Endaiadere is apparent. A trench dug across the old airstrip, bottom left, denies its use to the Allies (p.51)
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Maps are presented in the DjVu format.
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(Robert S. Rush. Osprey Publishing, 2002)
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Chronology (p.15-16)
Map 1. Route of the 165th Infantry, Pacific Ocean Area Theater of Operations, 1942-1945 (p.13)
Map 2. Makin Atoll, Butaritari Island, November 20-22, 1943 (p.31)
Map 3. Tactical examples. Company all-round defense in dense terrain, used to limit enemy infiltration and attack from rear (E)
Map 4. Saipan, 15 June - 11 August 1944. Harakiri Gulch, 6 July 1944 (p.47)
Map 5. Okinawa, 1 April - 21 June 1945. Item Pocket, 20-25 April (p.55)
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(Robert S. Rush. Osprey Publishing, 2002)
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Chronology (p.13-14)
Map 1. The route of the 133d Infantry Regiment in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations (p.13)
Map 2. Night attack on Fondouk el Aouareb, 9 April 1943 (p.30)
Map 3. Tactical examples. Monte Cassino house clearing, 1944 (F)
Map 4. Attack on Cassino, 3 February 1944 (p.46)
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(Robert S. Rush. Osprey Publishing, 2002)
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Chronology (p.14-16)
Map 1. The route of the 22d Infantry in the ETO (p.13)
Map 2. Tactical examples. Taking out bunkers on the Siegfried Line, September 1944. This illustration shows the stages and principles of how to clear German bunkers and pillboxes on the Siegfried Line (West Wall), and is set on the borders of Germany in the fall of 1944. The Americans are attacking a section of large bunkers, and will remove the Germans from there. The four stages shown are as follows. 1. The Americans suppress and smoke the bunkers using an M4 Sherman, while infantrymen accompanied by an M10 tank destroyer attack in a narrow column until they are behind the bunker. 2. The M10 tank destroyer fires point blank at the rear door or aperture until a breach is made. There is now smoke/dust pouring from the front of the first bunker where the M4 tank shell has hit. The infantry have their rifles trained on the bunker, to cover exiting Germans. The Sherman M4 tank fires on another concrete bunker at the front. 3. A soldier with a flamethrower advances, first firing unlit naphtha through the openings and then firing a burning blast, either smoking out or killing the Germans within. Other infantrymen from the first squad of men stay under cover. 4. The M4 Sherman ceases firing against the second bunker, as US troops are now behind it. The M10 tank destroyer and the 1st rifle squad now move to the rear of the recently blasted 2nd bunker. Once again, they try to stay under cover. The second rifle squad of 12 soldiers maneuvers around the destroyed bunker to attack another one (F)
Map 3. Tactical examples. Squad defensive positions 1942 and 1944. The top half shows the rifle squad defensive positions in 1942: a squad of men would lay themselves out so and dig their foxholes to defend against enemy attack. The bottom half shows the rifle squad defensive positions in 1944: note the different layout. Early doctrine recommended individual foxholes because they were harder targets to hit and did not collapse as easily as larger two-person foxholes when shelled or driven over by tanks. Later leaders found that although this was true, the isolation of a soldier in a foxhole negated all advantages, so opted for larger two- and three-man positions, in which one soldier could sleep while the other pulled guard (H)
Map 4. Hurtgen Forest. November 20, 1944 (p.48)
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(David Westwood. Osprey Publishing, 2002)
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Map 1. The Military Districts (Wehrkreise) in Germany 1939. The towns were the administrative centres of their respective areas (p.6)
Map 2. Tactical examples. The infantry platoon (section 1940) in the advance to contact. Sicherer/Scouts Gr/Section (with number); I.Gran.W.Tr / light mortar group (from Kuhlwein Schutzenzug und Kompanie in Gefecht) (p.30)
Map 3. Movements of 18 Infantry Division in the Polish Campaign, 1-23 September 1939 (p.32)
Map 4. Movements of 18 Infantry Division in France (Phase I), 10-31 May 1940 (p.45)
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(Alan Jeffreys. Osprey Publishing, 2003)
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Chronology (p.6-7)
Map 1. Tactical examples. Tactics (D)
Map 2. Tactical examples. Ambush (E)
Map 3. Sinzweya, also called the ‘Admin Box’. Arakan, February 1944 (p.46)
Map 4. Kohima battlefield (p.50)
Map 5. Map of Jail Hill and the surrounding hills taken by the 1st Battalion Queens Royal Regiment (p.51)
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(Velimir Vuksic. Osprey Publishing, 2003)
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Chronology (p.12-13)
Map 1. Yugoslavia, 1941-43 (p.5)
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(David Westwood. Osprey Publishing, 2003)
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Map 1. Hill 312. The Advance from Romanovka to Slutsk, 13-18 September 1941 (p.20)
Map 2. Hill 747. Northeast of Rschev, 15 November 1941 (p.25)
Map 3. Defense of Verkhne-Golubaya, 23 November 1942 (p.44)
Map 4. Defense of Khristische, 23-27 January 1942 (p.48)
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(Kenneth W. Estes. Osprey Publishing, 2005)
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Chronology (p.5-6)
Map 1. Japanese vs. USMC Tanks, Parry Island (Eniwetok), 1100, 22 February 1944. The first standup fight between USMC and Japanese tanks fell to the men of the 2d Separate Tank Company on Parry Island in the Eniwetok Atoll. Three Type 95 light tanks charged the beachhead, much to the surprise of all, but they were quickly overwhelmed by the firepower of USMC M4A2 tanks (p.6)
Map 2. Japanese Tank Assault, Saipan, 0400, 17 June 1944. The Japanese tank assault on Saipan, the largest encountered in the Pacific war, fell upon the lines of the 6th Marine Regiment and its supporting tanks of B Company, 2d Tank Battalion. Poor light and fear of causing friendly casualties prevented the USMC tanks from destroying more than a portion of the tanks, leaving the rest to the weapons of the 6th Marines (p.48)
Map 3. Japanese Counterattack, Peleliu, 1650, 15 September 1944. The Japanese tank attack at Peleliu surprised the attacking Marine Corps battalions, and the commander of the 1st Tank Battalion surmised that the Japanese commander must have thought the USMC tanks had not been landed. Two platoons of M4A2 tanks, one on the beach and another advancing across the airfield, proved more than equal to the task (p.50)
Map 4. Tank Assault, Battle of Tenaru, 1600, 21 August 1942. The Battle of Tenaru saw the only clear success by USMC tanks in the Guadalcanal Campaign. The Ichiki Detachment had rashly crossed the Tenaru River to attack the lines of the 1st Marine Regiment, drawn up on the shore of the Ilu River. The Japanese were hemmed in against the shore and laced by fire from infantry, mortars, and artillery. The four M2A4 tanks administered the coup de grace (p.62)
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(David Westwood. Osprey Publishing, 2005)
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Map 1. Attack on Partisan HQ in Lepel-Borisov Area, 24-26 June 1943 (p.11)
Map 2. Tactical examples. A prepared battalion defensive position, showing its considerable minefield protection (p.16)
Map 3. German counterattack in southern Poland, 16 August 1944 (p.22)
Map 4. Attack on Hill 856 east of the River Litsa, 1-2 February 1944 (p.30)
Map 5. Situation of 307 Infantry Regiment, 15 August - 13 September 1944 (p.47)
Map 6. Russian bridgehead on the River Pripyat, June 1944 (p.52)
Map 7. Russian crossing of the River Oder south of Frankfort a.d. O, 22-28 February 1945 (p.57)
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(David K. Yelton. Osprey Publishing, 2006)
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Chronology (p.6-7)
Map 1. Map of the northwest German region where Volkssturm Battalion 38/20 served (p.5)
Map 2. Tactical examples. Volkssturm squad defense of a roadblock (Isselburg) (C)
Map 3. Tactical examples. Volkssturm river defense position (Dornick / Niederrhein) (D)